Why Israel will never let Iran go nuclear. She can't. She won't.

hat tip: Elijah

This is from a link put up by Elijah. It is heavily edited by me. You can read the entire report here

Sun-Tzu’s principles concerning negotiation and diplomacy state that political initiatives and agreements may be useful, but purposeful military preparations should never be neglected. The primary objective of every state should be to weaken enemies without actually engaging in armed combat. This objective links the ideal of “complete victory” to a “strategy for planning offensives.” In Chapter Four, “Military Disposition,” Sun-Tzu tells his readers: “One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture; one who can be victorious attacks. . . . Those who excel at defense bury themselves away below the lowest depths of Earth Those who excel at offense move from above the greatest heights of Heaven.”


The under lying rationale of “Project Daniel” was the presumption that Israel
urgently needs a coherent plan for dealing with existential threats, and that we (The Group) were well-positioned intellectually and professionally to propose such a plan.

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Project Daniel concluded that:
the primary threats to Israel’s physical survival were more likely to come
from enemies that were not irrational.

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The dangers of relying too heavily upon active defenses such as anti-ballistic missile systems, a reliance whereby Israel would likely bury itself away “below the lowest depths of Earth,” Project Daniel boldly advises that Israel take certain prompt initiatives in removing existential threats. These initiatives include striking first (preemption) against enemy WMD development, manufacturing, storage, control, and deployment centers—a recommendation fully consistent with longstanding international law regarding “anticipatory self-defense.”
I f, for any reason, the doctrine of preemption should fail to prevent an enemy Arab state or Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the Daniel group advises that Israel cease immediately its current policy of nuclear ambiguity, and proceed at once to a position of open nuclear deterrence.

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Following Sun- Tzu, the clear purpose of our recommendation is to achieve a complete Israeli victory without engaging in actual hostilities. In the words of our report: “The overriding priority of Israel’s nuclear deterrent force must always be that it preserves the country’s security without ever having to be fired against any target.”

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Everyone who studies Israeli nuclear strategy has heard about the so-called “Samson Option.” This is generally thought to be a last resort strategy wherein Israel’s nuclear weapons are used not for prevention of war or even for war-waging, but simply as a last spasm of vengeance against an enemy state that had launched massive (probably unconventional) counter-city and/or counterforce attacks against Israel. In this situation, Israel’s leaders, faced with national extinction, would conclude that even though the Jewish State would not survive, it would “die” together with its destroyers.

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Faced with imminent and existential attacks, Israel, taking a cue from The National Security Strategy of t he United Stat es of America, dated 20 September 2002, could preempt enemy aggression wi th conventional forces. American strategy of preemptive attack affirms the growing reasonableness of anticipatory self-defense under international law. If Israel were to draw upon such expressions of US policy, the targeted state’s response would determine Israel’s subsequent moves. If this response were in any way nuclear, Israel would assuredly undertake nuclear counter-retaliation. If this enemy retaliation were to involve certain chemical and/or biological weapons, Israel might also determine to undertake a quantum escalatory initiative. If the enemy state’s response to Israeli preemption were limited to hard-target conventional strikes, it is highly improbable that Israel would resort to nuclear counter-retaliation. On the other hand, if the enemy state’s conventional retaliation were an all-out strike directed toward Israel’s civilian populations as well as to Israeli military targets—an existential strike—Israeli nuclear counter-retaliation could not be ruled out.

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To protect itself against enemy strikes, particularly those carrying existential costs, Israel needs to exploit every component of its nuclear arsenal.

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Potential enemies need to recognize that Israeli nuclear weapons are sufficiently invulnerable to attack and t hey are aimed at high-value targets. In this context, the Final Report of Project Daniel recommends that “a recognizable retaliatory force should be fashioned with the capacity to destroy some 15 high-value targets scattered widely over pertinent enemy
states in t he Middle East.”

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Excluding an irrational actor—a prospect that falls outside the logic of nuclear
deterrence—enemies of Israel would assuredly refrain from nuclear or biological attacks that would presumptively elicit massive counter-value reprisals. This reasoning holds only to the extent that these enemies fully believe that Israel will make good on its announced strategy. Israel’s nuclear deterrent, once it were made explicit, would need to state to all prospective nuclear enemies: “Israel’s nuclear weapons, dispersed, multiplied, and hardened, are targeted upon your major cities. These weapons wi ll never be used against these targets except in retaliation for certain WMD aggressions. Unless our population centers are struck first by nuclear attack, certain levels of biological attack, or by combined nuclear and biological attack, we will not harm your cities.”

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Recalling the thoughts of the ancient Chinese military thinker Sun-Tzu, the very highest form of military success is achieved when one’ s strategic objectives can be met without any actual use of force. To meet its primary deterrence objective—deterrence of enemy first-strikes—Israel must seek and achieve a visible second-strike capability with the ability to target approximately 15 enemy cities. Ranges should encompass cities in Libya and Iran, with nuclear bomb yields at levels sufficient to fully compromise the aggressor’s viability as a functioning state.

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Conclusions

Reflecting on Project Daniel’s efforts, the group has been able to
evaluate the broad range of recommendations contained in Israel’s Strategic
Future. These recommendations concern, inter alia:

• The manifest need for an expanded policy of preemption.
• An ongoing re-evaluation of “nuclear ambiguity.”
• Recognizable preparations for appropriate “counter-value” reprisals in the case of certain WMD aggressions.
• Adaptations to a “paradigm shift” away from classical patterns of warfare.
• Expanded cooperation with the United States in the Global War on Terrorism and in future inter-state conflicts in the Middle East.
• Deployment of suitable active defense systems.
• Avoidance of nuclear war- fighting wherever possible.
• Various ways to improve Israel’s nuclear deterrence.
• Vital differences between rational and non-rational adversaries.
• Changing definitions of existential harms.
• Legal elements of “anticipatory self-defense.”
• Possibilities for the peaceful settlement of disputes in the region.
• Budgetary constraints and opportunities.
• The maintenance of Israel’s qualitative edge.
• Preparations for “regime targeting.”
• Implications for Israel related to the growing anarchy in world affairs.