“Soft despotism is a term coined by Alexis de Tocqueville describing the state into which a country overrun by "a network of small complicated rules" might degrade. Soft despotism is different from despotism (also called 'hard despotism') in the sense that it is not obvious to the people."
“Our Friends and Allies Funded ISIS to Destroy Hezbollah”
In case there is any doubt about Israel preferring ISIS over Hezbollah, listen to former Israeli Ambassador to the US, Michael Oren, talking to a friendly crowd. Case fucking closed.
Former US General and Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, Wesley Clark, told CNN in a recent interview that
“ISIS got started through funding from our friends and allies. People will tell you in the region that if you want somebody who will fight to the death against Hezbollah, you don’t put out a recruiting poster saying ‘sign up for us we’re gonna make a better world.’ You go after zealots and you go after these religious fundamentalists. That’s who fights Hezbollah. It’s like a Frankenstein.”
Wesley’s statements echo assertions by Israeli leaders who say that their main threat is Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, not ISIS, al-Qaeda, etc. who pose “no threat,” according to the Israelis. I wonder who told Clark that the main purpose of creating ISIS was to undermine Hezbollah, Israel’s chief rival in the region?
“Tehran-Damascus-Beirut arc is the greatest danger,” says outgoing Israeli envoy to US Michael Oren. “‘Bad guys’ backed by Iran are worse for Israel than ‘bad guys’ who are not supported by the Islamic Republic, Israel’s outgoing ambassador to the US Michael Oren told The Jerusalem Post in a parting interview.
AND JUST SO YOU DON’T FORGET WHO PAYS FOR THE NEOCON DREAM:
Islamic State 'planning to use Libya as gateway to Europe'
Exclusive: Jihadists hoping to use Libya as a “gateway" to wage war across the whole of southern Europe, plans by Isil supporters reveal
Telegraph
The jihadists hope to flood Libya with Isil militiamen who will then pose as migrants on people trafficking vessels heading to EuropePhoto: Marcello Paternostro/AFP
Islamic State militants are planning a takeover of Libya as a "gateway" to wage war across the whole of southern Europe, letters written by the group's supporters have revealed.
The jihadists hope to flood the north African state with militiamen from Syria and Iraq, who will then sail across the Mediterranean posing as migrants on people trafficking vessels, according to plans seen by Quilliam, the British anti-extremist group.
The fighters would then run amok in southern European cities and also try to attack maritime shipping.
The document is written by an Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) propagandist who is believed to be an important online recruiter for the terror in Libya, where security has collapsed in the wake of the revolution that unseated Colonel Gaddafi in 2011.
The Isil propagandist, who uses the alias Abu Arhim al-Libim, describes Libya as having "immense potential" for Isil. He points out with relish that it is awash with weapons from the Libyan civil war, when large quantities of Col Gaddafi's arsenals were appropriated by rebels. Some of those weapons came from Britain, which supplied the Gaddafi regime with machine guns, sniper rifles and ammunition during his final years in power, when he was seen as an ally against Islamist terrorism.
Mr Libim also points out that Libya is less than around 300 miles from parts of the nearest European mainland.
He writes: "It has a long coast and looks upon the southern Crusader states, which can be reached with ease by even a rudimentary boat."
He also cites "the number of trips known as 'illegal immigration' from this coast, which are huge in number ... if this was even partially exploited and developed strategically, pandemonium could be wrought in the southern European states and it is even possible that there could be a closure of shipping lines and targeting of Crusader ships and tankers."
The propagandist's comments come amid growing concerns in the West about the collapse of security in Libya, which has a large diaspora population in the UK.
On Monday, Sir John Sawers, the former head of MI6, said that Britain should consider putting ground troops there to stop the country "being exploited by fanatics".
Security officials also share Isil's view about the possibility of using people trafficking boats to smuggle fighters into Europe.
Thanks to its vast, porous desert borders with Sub-Saharan Africa, Libya has long been a key operating hub for trafficking boats heading into Europe, but numbers have escalated dramatically since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime.
Italy's interior ministry estimates that at least 200,000 refugees and immigrants are poised to make the crossing from Libya to Sicily or the tiny island of Lampedusa, Italy's southernmost territory.
Last year more than 170,000 arrived in Italy by boat, including tens of thousands of Syrians fleeing the civil war in their home country.
Search and rescue efforts entered a dangerous new phase this week when an Italian coast guard vessel rescuing migrants 50 miles off the Libyan coast was threatened by smugglers armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles.
While the gang were concerned only with retrieving their boat for another smuggling trip, the incident demonstrated the potential threat were Isil to adopt similar smuggling tactics.
There are also fears that an increased Isil presence in Libya would encourage existing migrants there to flee north in far greater numbers.
Nasser Kamel, Egypt's ambassador to London, warned Britain brace itself for 'boats full of terrorists' unless action was taken in Libya. He spoke after 2,164 migrants were rescued at sea in a 24-hour period over the weekend in what has been described as an 'exodus without precedent'.
"Those boat people who go for immigration purposes and try to cross the Mediterranean ... in the next few weeks, if we do not act together, they will be boats full of terrorists also," he said.
Security in Libya has been on the slide due to the inability of the various militias that helped oust Col Gaddafi to agree a shared agenda. Its internationally recognised government is currently operating from the eastern city of Tobruk after being forced out of Tripoli by a rival government loosely allied with a range of Islamist factions.
Most of these groups do not share Isil's extremist vision, although some are believed to have links to the al-Qaeda faction that killed the US Ambassador, Chris Stevens, during an attack on a diplomatic compound in the eastern city of Benghazi in 2012.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Isil's leader, has since laid claim to Libya as part of his "Caliphate".
Whilst on the whole that remains more rhetoric than reality, support for the group in this war ravaged state is growing.
In September, Abu Nabil, an Iraqi and key leader within Isil, travelled to the country to build support for the group. His men took control of much of Derna, a traditionally conservative city in the east of the country, that is now being run according to the extremist group's strict Shariah law.
Hundreds of Libyans who had travelled to fight alongside Isil in Syria have started to return to fight for the group on home turf, residents say. They have expanded the group's influence into the east of the country, taking controlling of parts of Sirte, a former Gaddafi stronghold.
In late January, a group of gunmen invoked Isil's name in an attack on the Corinthia, a five-star hotel in downtown Tripoli, killing at least eight people.
Whilst The Telegraph cannot independently verify the identity of Mr Libim, the propagandist, analysts believe that his writing on Libya is widely read and influential online.
"Twitter has shut down Libim's accounts several times and each time he starts a new one he gets thousands of followers very quickly, which is typical of an influential Isil affiliate," saidCharlie Winter, a researcher with the Quilliam Foundation.
Mr Winter added: "In terms of the demographics of Isil support in Libya, we see a lot in common with its base of support in Iraq and Syria – many of its fighters are young, disfranchised men who have only bought into Isil's brand of Islamist zealotry because they are looking to forcibly empower themselves in the penetrating absence of the state.
"The risks Europe faces from Isil pre-eminence in Libya are substantial."
David Cameron has condemned the "barbaric" executions of the Egyptian Christians, who were kidnapped by Isil while working in Sirte. He added that he did not regret British efforts to oust Col Gaddafi, despite the threat from terrorists, insisting that it was the 'right thing to do".
President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi of Egypt called for an international coalition to defeat Isil in Libya on Tuesday, saying: "We will not allow them to cut the heads off our children".
Islamic State militants have reportedly burnt 45 people alive near the town al-Baghdadi in western Iraq. News of the atrocities follows the recent beheading of 21 Christians in Libya and the brutal burning to death of a Jordanian pilot.
According to local police chief Colonel Qasim al-Obeidi, cited by the BBC, some of the executed people may be from Iraqi security forces, but no precise data was given. Al-Obeidi also reportedly said the town was under attack, particularly its security forces and official buildings, and asked the Iraqi government and international community for help.
The town al-Baghdadi in Anbar province was seized by the militants last Thursday. It is located only eight kilometers away from the Iraqi air base Ain al-Asad, which houses over 300 American Marines who train local forces. The militants unsuccessfully attempted to capture the base on Friday as well, even using several suicide bombers in the attack.
About 90 percent of the territory of the al-Baghdadi district is under the control of the Islamic State, Reuters reported, citing an Iraqi official.
In another setback for the fight against the Islamic State, one of the commanders of Shia militia forces, cleric Moqtada Sadr, declared that his troops have withdrawn from a larger Shia militia group fighting the extremists. Sadr said that Shia groups not under his control were “wreaking havoc through murdering, kidnapping and violating sanctuaries.” The militia has been accused of brutality towards Sunni civilians.The news follows several acts of extreme violence committed by the insurgents. A video released on Sunday showed the beheading of 21 Christian Egyptians kidnapped in Libya. The next day, the Egyptian Air Forces hit Islamic state position in Libya.
The current crime is the second case of burning people to death this year. In the beginning of February, the insurgents released a video showing the execution of Jordanian pilot Moath ak-Kasasbeh. Al-Kasasbeh was captured by militants in late December, when they downed his jet over Syria as it participated in US-led airstrikes against the militant group. According to the video, he was burned alive in a cage.
1US officials believe that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has authorized his government to release secret details of the US nuclear negotiations with Iran to the Israeli press, according to Washington Post columnist David Ignatius.
2The alleged leaks would appear designed to undermine the negotiations, which Israel opposes.
3In response, according to Ignatius, the US has decided to "reduce the exchange of sensitive information about the Iran talks" with Israel.
This would be a major new low in the US-Israel breakdown
It is important to note that Ignatius does not detail his sources for the story, and has no official confirmation from either the Israeli or American governments. The columnist is known as a non-partisan reporter with a strong track record and close links in US intelligence agencies, so his report is so far being taken seriously.
The alleged leaks are, to be clear, not highly sensitive secrets. Rather, they are technical details of the US offers to Iran in the nuclear talks, such as the number of centrifuges that Iran would be allowed to maintain. (The details of negotiations are always kept secret while they're being hammered out, so that all parties can negotiate more freely, something Israeli negotiators have done themselves, for example in reaching the Oslo Accords.)
Ignatius' sources contend that the Israeli leaks were not only secret but misleading, releasing incomplete information in a way that would make the US position on Iran appear more generous than it actually was. Those sources also point out that Israeli media began publishing these secrets in late January, just days after Obama and Netanyahu had a contentious Jan. 12 phone call over the Iran talks. Also in that window, Netanyahu announced he would visit the US to speak to Congress on a Republican invitation, undermining the White House.
The US reaction has allegedly been to reduce intelligence sharing with Israel. "US officials believed that Netanyahu's office was the source of these reports and concluded that they couldn't be as transparent as before with the Israel leader about the secret talks," Ignatius reports.
This would be bad for everyone — including people who want a deal with Iran
It is worth reiterating that, even if Ignatius' sources are correct, both the Israeli leaks and the US withholding are limited to the American negotiating terms with Iran, an important but relatively narrow topic within the wide field of US-Israel intelligence cooperation.
Still, the US and Israel have a long and productive track record of intelligence sharing, particularly when it comes to Iran, and this would be a worrying indication of the US-Israel breakdown. That should worry everyone, and not just observers who are skeptical of an Iran deal or who believe that preserving the level of US-Israel cooperation is more important.
Some proponents of a nuclear deal with Iran may welcome this news as demonstrating that Netanyahu is a bad actor who should be sidelined from the negotiations process. But this would be misguided, and even proponents of a deal should worry about this development. One reason that Iran is willing to negotiate at all is that the US has succeeded in putting enormous pressure on the country and its nuclear program — often with crucial Israeli help. That has meant both gathering intelligence and, in cases such as the 2010 cyberattack on centrifuges via the Stuxnet virus, offensive operations.
If the US and Israel cooperate less on Iran, and the pressure on Iran drops (or Tehran believes that it is likely to drop), then Iran has less incentive to make the painful concessions necessary to strike a deal, and a final nuclear deal is thus less likely to be achieved.
We are not necessarily at that point yet. But the possibility that the US might be limiting intelligence cooperating with Israel even on the narrow topic of Iran negotiations — and that Israel could potentially take actions that would predictably force the US to do so — is a worrying sign.
The working governments of Libya and Iraq were eliminated by FUKUS. A similar attempt was made in Egypt and Syria. This is what is left in the wake of the Neocon dream of destruction.
The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has raged, the United States has tightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table, a palpable sense of crisis still looms.
It should not. Most U.S., European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possible outcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to restore stability to the Middle East.
POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED
The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First, diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so.
Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, which succeeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate deterrent.
The second possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. Iran would not be the first country to acquire a sophisticated nuclear program without building an actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it could produce a nuclear weapon on short notice.
Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hard-liners that they can enjoy all the benefits of having a bomb (such as greater security) without the downsides (such as international isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability might not work as intended.
The United States and its European allies are primarily concerned with weaponization, so they might accept a scenario in which Iran stops short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that it views a significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. It is possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could appease major Western powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it would be by an actual one and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts at subverting Iran's nuclear program through sabotage and assassination -- which could lead Iran to conclude that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks.
The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its current course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential threat. Such language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled up whenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far, every time another country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have always changed tack and decided to live with it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less.
Israel's regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced. What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge.
Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to use force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran. But the very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term.
Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored.
UNFOUNDED FEARS
One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international system. The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innately irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by "mad mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders. Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no propensity for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume otherwise.
Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed them to argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic. If Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against Israel, even though doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear.
Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move.
Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists with nuclear arms. The problem with these concerns is that they contradict the record of every other nuclear weapons state going back to 1945. History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break this mold.
As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk of being found out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States' impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, countries can never entirely control or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal. After all, building a bomb is costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties that cannot be trusted or managed.
Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded. Properly defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There is no reason to expect that this pattern will change now. Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would hardly signal the start of a landslide. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to the Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no reason a nuclear Iran should now.
REST ASSURED
In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today.
For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because open lines of communication will make the Western countries feel better able to live with a nuclear Iran. But the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm ordinary Iranians, with little purpose.
Most important, policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better.
