US interest rates at zero are 7% too high!

The Fed's impending blunder

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard Economics Last updated: October 27th, 2010
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ambroseevans-pritchard/100008351/the-feds-impending-blunder/

OK, I’ve calmed down after a week of Jamon Iberico and Rioja in Granada’s Albaycin, so I will try to be polite about the US Federal Reserve. Try, that is, not necessarily succeed.

For a good insight into the thinking of the New Keynesian priesthood that rules our money and our lives, it is worth reading “QE2: How Much is Needed?” by Jan Hatzius from Goldman Sachs.

His argument – crudely – is that US interest rates at zero are 7pc too high given the Taylor Rule on output gaps, et cetera (not that Professor Taylor himself happens to agree, but let us not quibble).

Since rates cannot be minus 7pc, the Fed would need to launch a $4 trillion blitz of fresh bond purchases to fully compensate, such is the mess that America’s leadership has inflicted on the Great Republic. I have over-simplified: Goldman Sachs relies on a “policy gap” concept, which factors in fiscal tightening et al.

This would push the Fed balance sheet to $6.3 trillion, above the $5 trillion pencilled in as the upper limit during the Great Crash.

Mr Hatzius is not saying the Fed will do this, or should do this. His forecast is that the Fed will start off with baby steps of $500bn spread over six months or so, rising over time to meet the bank’s “dual mandate of low inflation and sustainable employment”.

(Actually the Fed’s mandate is “to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” Stable prices are not the same as low inflation. It takes Ben Bernanke’s maniacal obsession with the doctrine of inflation targeting to twist this into a mandate for printing large sums of money at a time when the Dallas Fed’s `trimmed mean’ measure of annual inflation has jumped from 0.5pc in May, to 0.8pc in July, and 1.5pc in August. But again, let us not quibble).

Mr Hatzius said the Fed sees “tail-risks” in using QE to the full, but may nevertheless do another $2 trillion in the end.

I have no doubt that this report reflects thinking at the Fed Board in Washington, and among Bernanke allies at the San Francisco Fed and Boston Fed – though not of course at the Dallas Fed where Richard Fisher confesses: “In my darkest moments I have begun to wonder if the monetary accommodation we have already engineered might even be working in the wrong places.”

What we have is a glimpse into the Sanctum Sanctorum of money creation, a glimpse of Jesuitical fanaticism.

Now, I put my hand up and confess to having supported QE when the financial system was imploding in late 2008 and early 2009, and I continued to do so as the M3 money supply collapsed at 1930s rates earlier this year. I persist stubbornly in thinking that it was the right thing to do, AT THAT TIME.

But we are no longer in a systemic financial crisis, and the Fed’s motives have become subtly corrupted. Having argued during the boom that it was not the business of central banks to stop asset bubbles – and specifically that any fall-out could “safely” be cleaned up later – Bernanke now seems to determined to validate this absurd doctrine, bending all the sinews of the US economic and financial system to this end. One error leads to the next.

In a sense QE has worked all too well. M3 has stabilized. The M2 gauge used by the Fed – which was still contracting in May – has been growing annual rate of 8.4pc over the four weeks to mid-October. The pace has been accelerating for months.

OK, 8.4pc is not Weimar, but it is not imminent deflation either.

And what about velocity, the other part of the monetary cocktail? It is coming back from the dead as you can see below?

Simon Ward from Henderson Global Investors said his measure of velocity is rising at a robust rate of 8.7pc. “QE1 was justified during the crisis because monetary velocity was collapsing at that time. But now that velocity is recovering further QE is not needed. In fact it is potentially very dangerous,” he said.

Exactly.

This is the theme of Chapter 17 entitled “Velocity” in Jens O’ Parsson’s book Dying of Money, the cult text of our brave new world.

If I may recycle a passage from a column I wrote about the book in July: “Each big inflation – whether the early 1920s in Germany, or the Korean and Vietnam wars in the US – starts with a passive expansion of the quantity money. This sits inert for a surprisingly long time. The effect is much like lighter fuel on a camp fire before the match is struck.

People’s willingness to hold money can change suddenly for a “psychological and spontaneous reason” , causing a spike in the velocity of money. It can occur at lightning speed, over a few weeks. The shift invariably catches economists by surprise. They wait too long to drain the excess money.”

“Velocity took an almost right-angle turn upward in the summer of 1922,” said Mr O Parsson. Reichsbank officials were baffled. They could not fathom why the German people had started to behave differently almost two years after the bank had already boosted the money supply. He contends that public patience snapped abruptly once people lost trust and began to “smell a government rat”.

Hmm!

No doubt the Bernanke Fed views monetarism with contempt, despite paying lip service to Milton Friedman. This is a grave error. Surging M3 gave forewarning of the credit bubble from 2005-2007, and then rang alarm bells before the banking crash in late 2008. Ignore money and velocity at your peril.

The immediate effect of the Fed’s QE2 rhetoric has been to drive up commodity prices, negating much of the benefit. “How this possibly helps out the moribund US economy is anyone’s guess,” said David Rosenberg from Gluskin Sheff.

“If there is an `imbalance’, it is in the US pretending it can solve structural headwinds, overextended balance sheets, chronic unemployment and a massive housing inventory backlog with untested Fed policy tools,” he said.

Nor is it clear that Bernanke’s aim of driving down interest rates serves any useful purpose at this stage. As GMO’s Jeremy Grantham argues, this policy is reducing pensioners to penury. “Lower rates always transfer wealth from retirees (debt owners) to corporations (debt for expansion, theoretically) and the financial industry. This time, there are more retirees and the pain is greater, and corporations are notably avoiding capital spending and, therefore, the benefits are reduced. It is likely that there is no net benefit to artificially low rates.”

If you crunch everything in the mixer you can perhaps claim that QE2 will be a net plus of sorts. But is it really wise policy to embark on such a contentious adventure at a time of deep misgivings among the public and in Congress, and in the face of blistering criticism from China, Germany, Russia, as well as a lot of Western economists?

I hate to cite Alan Greenspan but he is right this time to warn that the Fed is playing a “dangerous game”, whatever the claims of New Keynesian economic theory. Politics matter.

Yes, the Fed is right to worry that protracted deflation would be lethal in an economy with total debt at 350pc of GDP. Those who call for a liquidationist policy of mass bankruptcy and default are an even greater danger to political stability than the Bernanke Fed. That policy was enacted from 1930-1932, with observable results.
But I suspect that something else is happening at the Fed. Bernanke is refusing to accept that the US must go through the slow painful cure of debt-deleveraging. He is trying to air-brush away the consequences of 20 years of debt creation and Fed error.

The proper role for the Fed from now on is to steer a narrow course between the Scylla of deflation and the Charybdis of inflation, for year after, for as long as it takes, until America is properly purged. AND THEN NEVER COMMIT SAME IDIOTIC MISTAKE AGAIN.

Pick Your Poison. This is Dangerous Territory.

Currency wars are necessary if all else fails

The overwhelming fact of the global currency system is that America needs a much weaker dollar to bring its economy back into kilter and avoid slow ruin, yet the rest of the world cannot easily handle the consequences of such a wrenching adjustment. There is not enough demand to go around.

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Published: 8:09PM BST 10 Oct 2010

Asian investment in plant has run ahead of Western ability to consume. The debt-strapped households of Middle America, or Britain and Spain, can no longer hold up the dysfunctional edifice. Asians must take over, or it will come down on their own heads.

The countries actively intervening in exchange markets to suppress their currencies – China, Japan, Korea, Thailand, even Switzerland, to name a few – are all too often the same ones that have the biggest trade surpluses with the US.They are taking active steps to prevent America extricating itself from the worst unemployment since the Great Depression, now 17.1pc on the latest U6 index and rising again.

Each country is doing so for understandable reasons: Japan to avoid a deflationary crisis, China to hold together a political order that is more fragile than it looks. In both these cases they are trapped because they clung too long to a mercantilist export strategy, failing to wean themselves off American demand when the going was good.

Yet this is an intolerable situation for the US. It should be no surprise that Washington has begun to retaliate in earnest, and not just by passing the Reform for Fair Trade Act in the House (not yet the Senate), clearing the way for punitive tariffs against currency manipulators.

The atomic bomb, of course, is quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve. America has in effect issued an ultimatum to China and G20: either you stop this predatory behaviour and agree to some formula for global rebalancing, or we will deploy QE2 `a l’outrance’ to flood your economies with excess liquidity. We will cause you to overheat and drive up your wage costs. We will impose a de facto currency revaluation by more brutal and disruptive means, and there is little you can do to stop it. Pick your poison.

This is what QE2 means, though Fed officials prefer to talk of their “mandate” of supporting employment. It is nothing like QE1, which was emergency action to halt the economic free-fall of late 2008 and early 2009. This time the Fed is using QE as a long-term tool to manage America’s chronic ailments.

Uber-dovish Fed comments over recent days have been enough to send the dollar crashing to a 15-year low of 82 against the Japanese yen, to below parity against Swiss franc, and back to the EMU pain barrier of $1.40 against the euro.

There was much tut-tutting about currency warfare at the IMF meeting over the weekend. "If one lets this slide into protectionism, we run the risk of the mistakes of the 1930," said World Bank chief Robert Zoellick.

You have to say this kind of thing if you run a Bretton Woods institution, but in real life wars occur because somebody finds the status quo unacceptable, perhaps justifiably so. As Nobel economist Paul Krugman puts it: “people are looking for innocuous ways to deal with this problem, and there aren’t any”.

Devaluation was not the mistake of the 1930s: it was the cure, albeit a bad one. The Gold Standard broke down during the inter-war years because the US and France had structurally undervalued exchange rates (like China/Asia today) and ceased recycling their trade surpluses (like China/Asia today). This caused a deflationary downward spiral for everybody.

Escaping from such a deformed system was a path to recovery. The parallel with modern globalization – though not exact – is obvious. So is the 1930s lesson that currency and trade clashes are asymmetric: they are calamitous for surplus countries, but not always for deficit countries. Britain enjoyed a five-year mini-boom after retreating into an Empire trade bloc in 1932.

Fed chair Ben Bernanke knows his history. In a speech as a junior Fed governor he described Roosevelt’s 40pc devaluation against gold as “an effective weapon” against deflation and slump, adding “1934 was one of the best years of the century for the stock market”.

I suspect that the Bernanke Fed is working with the Treasury to steer the dollar lower, and above all to stop it rising again, since the global dollar index looks poised for a powerful rebound.

There is certainly something odd about the latest Fed rhetoric. New York chief William Dudley said inflation had fallen to “unacceptable” levels. Has it really? The Dallas Fed’s `trimmed-mean’ CPE inflation index has been creeping up over the last three months.

His Chicago colleague Charles Evans has called for “much more accommodation". Why now? Bank credit has stopped contracting. The M2 money supply growth has accelerated sharply to a 7.4pc rate over the last month of published data. The St Louis Fed’s monetary multiplier has edged up at last. By the Fed’s own account, the double-dip scare of the early summer has abated.

I happen to think that the Fed will need to launch QE2 on a big scale as US fiscal tightening bites, the inventory spike fades, and the housing foreclosure crisis gathers pace. But we are not there yet. Fresh QE cannot be justified at this juncture under any normal understanding of central bank policy.

Is the Fed in reality trying to shore up consumption by juicing asset prices, and trying to ensure that the effect boosts jobs at home rather than in China, Germany, or Japan by holding down the dollar?

This is a dangerous moment for the world, and may backfire against the US itself. We are already starting to see the same sort of rush into oil and resources that played such havoc in mid-2008, and may have been a key trigger for the Great Recession. There is a risk that this commodity shock will hit before QE stimulus filters through.

And while the French deny that they are in talks with China over the creation of a new currency regime, I heard French finance minister Christine Lagarde say in person at a meeting in Italy that France would use its G20 presidency to push for an alternative to the dollar. She specifically cited the “Bancor”, the idea floated by Keynes in the 1940s for a commodity currency priced off a basket of metals. The US risks gambling away the “exorbitant privilege” it has enjoyed for two thirds of a century as currency hegemon.

Yet the surplus states have most to lose if this brinkmanship tips into commercial war. They must know this, but what we are witnessing may run deeper than a calculus of advantage. Was it naïve to think that Confucian Asia and the old democracies of the Atlantic seaboard can share an open global trading system?

Telegraph