COLLECTIVE MADNESS


“Soft despotism is a term coined by Alexis de Tocqueville describing the state into which a country overrun by "a network of small complicated rules" might degrade. Soft despotism is different from despotism (also called 'hard despotism') in the sense that it is not obvious to the people."
Showing posts with label George Washington. Show all posts
Showing posts with label George Washington. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

Ten Presidents Better than Franklin D, Roosevelt

Franklin Roosevelt? Pah! Here are ten far greater US presidents

January 17th, 2011

TELEGRAPH

Further evidence of the unwisdom of experts. A major survey of British academics has come up with a ranking of US presidents. In top place, predictably, is that old despot Franklin D Roosevelt.
What a perfect illustration of how received opinion tends to be wrong. Roosevelt is praised for having rescued the US from recession through the New Deal. In fact, the New Deal almost certainly prolonged the slump. Its mass of regulations encouraged cartels and crony capitalism, burdened businesses and deterred employers from taking on workers.  In 2004, two economists at the UCLA, Harold L Cole and Lee A Ohanian, conducted a major study which concluded that the New Deal had in fact lengthened the recession by seven years:
President Roosevelt believed that excessive competition was responsible for the Depression by reducing prices and wages, and by extension reducing employment and demand for goods and services. So he came up with a recovery package that would be unimaginable today, allowing businesses in every industry to collude without the threat of antitrust prosecution and workers to demand salaries about 25 percent above where they ought to have been, given market forces. The economy was poised for a beautiful recovery, but that recovery was stalled by these misguided policies.
Yup. In Britain, by contrast, the policy of slashing the deficit worked. You don’t believe me? You have in your mind, perhaps, an image of the Jarrow marchers? There were, as in any period of economic transition, some who suffered terribly. But the raw data tell the story: the 1930s saw greater net growth than any other decade in British history.
Even if we disregard FDR’s economic legacy, it is impossible to ignore his autocratic leanings. He ruled by executive decree, sidelined Congress, trampled on the jurisdiction of the states, ignored the two-term convention and attempted to pack the supreme court. He shifted power permanently from elected representatives to federal czars, from the legislature to the executive and from the states to Washington, ripping up the sublime constitution which his predecessors had served.
So, if not FDR, who? I’ve drafted my own list. It contains two libertarian, patriotic and incorruptible presidents who, had they lived in different times, might be remembered as titans: Grover Cleveland and Calvin Coolidge. Cleveland and Coolidge form golden links in the chain of limited government that links Jefferson to Reagan. Every politician should ponder Cleveland’s reply to a petition for federal aid in the aftermath of a natural disaster:
I can find no warrant for such an appropriation in the Constitution, and I do not believe that the power and duty of the general government ought to be extended to the relief of individual suffering which is in no manner properly related to the public service or benefit. Federal aid in such cases encourages the expectation of paternal care on the part of the government and weakens the sturdiness of our national character, while it prevents the indulgence among our people of that kindly sentiment and conduct which strengthens the bonds of a common brotherhood.
Anyway, here’s my list.
1.    Ronald Reagan (here’s why)
2.    Abraham Lincoln (here’s why)
3.    Thomas Jefferson (here’s why)
4.    Grover Cleveland
5.    Calvin Coolidge
6.    George Washington
7.    John Adams
8.    James Polk
9.    James Madison
10.  John Quincy Adams

Saturday, March 01, 2008

Washington on Our First Preemptive War


Lessons on Iraq From a Founding Father

By Brian O'Malley Washington Post
Saturday, March 1, 2008; Page A15

What would George Washington do about Iraq? In a December Outlook essay, historian Joseph J. Ellis argued that it's not possible to theorize exact answers because the "gap between the founders' time and ours is non-negotiable, and any direct linkage between them and now is intellectually problematic." But Ellis also conceded that this position is "unacceptable to many of us, because it suggests that the past is an eternally lost world that has nothing to teach us."

History does hold lessons about today's issues, and this is clear when considering Iraq and U.S. conduct in the war against terrorism. Consider the 1775-76 invasion of Canada, America's first preemptive war, which ended just days before Congress ratified the Declaration of Independence.

On Sept. 14, 1775, Washington wrote two letters to Col. Benedict Arnold, who led an American force into Canada. Five of Washington's points for invasion merit particular attention.

  • First, if the citizens don't want us there, don't go. Washington told Arnold, "You are by every means in your power to endeavour to discover the real sentiments of the Canadians towards our cause, and particularly as to this expedition; ever bearing in mind that if they are averse to it, and will not co-operate, or at least willingly acquiesce, it must fail of success. In this case you are by no means to prosecute the attempt."The expense of starting the mission and the disappointment of not completing it, Washington wrote, "are not to be put in competition with the dangerous consequences which may ensue from irritating them against us."
  • Second, the safety of American personnel depended on how they treated people. Washington wanted Arnold to "conciliate the affections" of the Canadian settlers and Indians and ordered Arnold to teach the soldiers and officers under his command "that not only the Good of their Country and their Honour, but their Safety depends upon the Treatment of these People."
  • Third, proper treatment of prisoners was necessary. The prominent British parliamentarian William Pitt, who championed American grievances, had a son serving in Canada. John Pitt was never taken into American custody, but in the event that Pitt was captured, Washington warned Arnold, "You cannot err in paying too much Honour to the Son of so illustrious a Character, and so true a Friend to America." This insistence on kind treatment extended beyond Pitt. Washington wrote, "Any other Prisoners who may fall into your Hands, you will treat with as much Humanity and kindness, as may be consistent with your own Safety and the publick Interest." Washington told Arnold to restrain the Continental troops and their Indian allies "from all Acts of Cruelty and Insult, which will disgrace the American Arms, and irritate our Fellow Subjects against us."
  • Fourth, any Americans who mistreated Canadians should be punished. "Should any American Soldier be so base and infamous as to injure any Canadian or Indian, in his Person or Property," Washington wrote, "I do most earnestly enjoin you to bring him to such severe and exemplary Punishment as the Enormity of the Crime may require." In an accompanying letter Washington added, "Should it extend to Death itself it will not be disproportional to its Guilt, at such a Time and in such a Cause."
  • Fifth, respect the people's religion. "As the Contempt of the Religion of a Country by ridiculing any of its Ceremonies or affronting its Ministers or Votaries, has ever been deeply resented, you are to be particularly careful to restrain every Officer and Soldier from such Imprudence and Folly and to punish every Instance of it."
American ideals won immediate support from the Canadians, but American misconduct squandered it. Contrary to Washington's orders, some American commanders disrespected Canadians' religion, property and liberty.

Lamenting this American misconduct, Washington wrote to Gen. Philip Schuyler on April 19, 1776, "I am afraid proper measures have not been taken to conciliate their affections, but rather that they have been insulted and injured, than which nothing could have a greater tendency to ruin our cause in that country; for human nature is such that it will adhere to the side from whence the best treatment is received."

George Washington is still first in war, first in peace and first in the hearts of his countrymen. It's too bad he couldn't have been the first person we asked about how to proceed in Iraq.

The writer is an adjunct professor at Jones College in Jacksonville, Fla.


Sunday, December 23, 2007

Mission Accomplished.

W had it right.

The first 'W', George Washington, won the US Revolutionary War by wearing down the British will to continue it. In this article the author makes a thoughtful argument..."Washington eventually realized -- and it took him three years to have this epiphany -- that the only way he could lose the Revolutionary War was to try to win it. The British army and navy could win all the major battles, and with a few exceptions they did; but they faced the intractable problem of trying to establish control over a vast continent whose population resented and resisted military occupation. As the old counterinsurgency mantra goes, Washington won by not losing, and the British lost by not winning. Our dilemma in Iraq is analogous to the British dilemma in North America -- and is likely to yield the same outcome."...

Do we have a time when we leave Iraq or do we garrison another piece of the US military in another part of the world indefinitely?


WHAT WOULD GEORGE DO?
Okay, He Never Saw a Chopper, but He Can Still Teach Us a Thing or Two.

By Joseph J. Ellis Washington Post
Sunday, December 23, 2007; Page B01

W hat would George Washington do about Iraq? An op-ed editor (not at The Washington Post, I should add) recently asked me to write an article answering that question, presumably because I had once written a biography of Washington and have just published another book on the founding generation. But, as I tried to explain, Washington would not be able to find Iraq on a map. Nor would he know about weapons of mass destruction, Islamic fundamentalism, Humvees, cellphones, CNN or Saddam Hussein.

The historically correct answer, then, is that Washington would not have a clue. It's tempting to believe that the political wisdom of our Founding Fathers can travel across the centuries in a time capsule, land among us intact, then release its insights into our atmosphere -- and as we breathed in that enriched air, our perspective on Iraq, global warming, immigration and the other hot-button issues of the day would be informed by what we might call "founders' genius." (Come to think of it, at least two Supreme Court justices who embrace the literal version of "original intent" believe that this is possible.) But there are no time capsules, except in science fiction. The gap between the founders' time and ours is non-negotiable, and any direct linkage between them and now is intellectually problematic.



This conclusion is not just irrefutable; it's also unacceptable to many of us, because it suggests that the past is an eternally lost world that has nothing to teach us. And if history has nothing to teach us, why in heaven's name should we study it?

One answer, I suppose, is for the sheer satisfaction of understanding those who have preceded us on this earthly trail. In that sense, history, like virtue, really is its own reward. But that answer doesn't really work for me. Nor does it explain the rather extraordinary surge of interest over the past decade in the men mythologized and capitalized as our Founding Fathers. Readers are buying books on the founders in unprecedented numbers because they think the founders have something to teach them. And they do. If we come to know them and listen hard enough, they will speak to us.

Suppose, then, that we rephrase the question. It is not "What would George Washington do about Iraq?" Rather, it is "How are your own views of Iraq affected by your study of Washington's experience leading a rebellion against a British military occupation?" The answer on this score is pretty clear. Washington eventually realized -- and it took him three years to have this epiphany -- that the only way he could lose the Revolutionary War was to try to win it. The British army and navy could win all the major battles, and with a few exceptions they did; but they faced the intractable problem of trying to establish control over a vast continent whose population resented and resisted military occupation. As the old counterinsurgency mantra goes, Washington won by not losing, and the British lost by not winning. Our dilemma in Iraq is analogous to the British dilemma in North America -- and is likely to yield the same outcome.

To take another example, your opinion on the current debate about how much power the executive branch should have will be significantly influenced if you read the debates about the subject in the Constitutional Convention and the states' ratifying conventions. For it will soon become clear that the most palpable fear that haunted all these debates was the specter of monarchy. Vice President Cheney's argument that limitations on the executive branch enacted in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and Watergate need to be rolled back is historically myopic. Virtually all of the Founding Fathers would regard the expansion of executive power since 1945 as a violation of the republican principles they cherished. And the way Congress has effectively surrendered war-making powers to the president since World War II represents a fundamental distortion of checks and balances as the founders intended them.

We have also strayed rather far from the world and wisdom of the founders in our current presidential-selection process. In our effort to replace the smoke-filled rooms of the old machine politics with a more democratic primary system, we have created a money-driven, media-dominated campaign culture that none of the founders would have been willing to tolerate. Indeed, they would have regarded anyone who succeeded in our modern-day electoral circus as a clown unworthy of the office. The degree of egomaniacal ambition required to negotiate the current campaign culture would strike all the most prominent founders, save perhaps Aaron Burr, as incompatible with the qualities of mind and heart essential for presidential leadership. It's a bit disquieting to acknowledge, but it's likely that none of our first six presidents -- Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe and John Quincy Adams -- would have run for office in the current political environment.

Even though all efforts to have the founders join us in a conversation about our current issues are futile exercises, like trying to plant cut flowers, the urge to create this conversation appears to be irresistible. And the most seductive, resonant and controversial founder of all, the one who gets the most hits on the Internet, is Thomas Jefferson.

Because Jefferson was the prophet of the American promise, the author of those 55 words that begin "We hold these truths to be self-evident," he has always been a historical trophy that all sides seek to claim. For Franklin D. Roosevelt, Herbert Hoover, Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, Jefferson was the ultimate prize, the ace of spades in the American political deck.

This would have struck Jefferson as highly ironic, for he was on record as believing that each generation should be sovereign, not weighted down by what he called "the dead hand of the past." In that sense, Jefferson's greatest legacy was to oppose all legacies. He also made it clear that, once the United States became a thickly populated, urban, industrial nation, his agrarian vision became essentially irrelevant. That means that our political context for nearly 100 years has been resolutely post-Jeffersonian. Those folks claiming his mantle, such as those Supreme Court justices who declare their allegiance to the "original intentions" of the framers, are invariably imposing their own values and convictions under the cover of his name.

Finally, and somewhat more problematically, an understanding of the founders' mentality complicates our view of our role as Britain's successor as the world's dominant power. The United States began with a conspicuously anti-imperial ethos, and we have had it imprinted on our political DNA from the very start. We were the first former colony to win a war for independence (against Britain, no less) and the first large-scale republic committed to the principle of government by consent rather than coercion.

In that sense, our primal values make us a very reluctant world power in the Roman or British mode. For good historical reasons, we lack the requisite imperial stamina of the British Empire in its "sun-never-sets" phase. Our origins are at odds with all previous versions of a world power. The Romans and British would have experienced no twinges of conscience in leaving a substantial military garrison in Iraq for an indefinite period. But we do, which is one reason why a healthy majority of U.S. citizens want us to leave Iraq as soon as possible. A republic, the world's first large-scale republic, simply cannot be an empire of the conventional European sort. This legacy of the founders complicates our status as the reigning world power.

One could counter with the claim that our anti-imperial origins were always more rhetorical than real. Just ask the Native Americans, or call attention to our apparently permanent military garrisons in Germany and South Korea. They certainly have the look and feel of old-style Roman and British imperialism, wholly compatible with the apparent current plan of the Bush administration to leave a garrison of about 50,000 troops in Iraq.

What would Washington do? Well, he did speak of a prospective American empire, though he was thinking primarily of our eventual domination of the North American continent, not the globe. On a few occasions, he seemed to suggest that if we played our cards right in the 19th century, the United States might replace Britain as the dominant power in the 20th. That indeed happened. But would he have endorsed a hegemonic U.S. foreign policy based on military power? Probably not. But that's my opinion, not necessarily Washington's.


Joseph J. Ellis is the Ford Foundation professor of history at Mount Holyoke College. His books include "Founding Brothers," "American Sphinx" and,

most recently, "American Creation."