How Will a Culture of Permanent War Impact America's Future? (Doug Bandow) Cato

"The world today is an unruly mess. But Neocons are more responsible than anyone else for America being stuck in the chaos. Embarrassed at the havoc they have wreaked, they blame President Obama for every problem big and small. However, he is a worthy successor to the Neocon-friendly Bush. If there's anyone who can't be blamed for the status quo, it is libertarians.

We are living in The Neocon Moment, a testament to the foolishness and arrogance of those who believe themselves to be engineers of peoples, societies, and nations. Yet Washington officials have yet to tire of America's permanent state of war. Only when the American people insist that politicians make peace, not war, will The Libertarian Moment finally arrive.”

Those who oppose a deal can be expected to step up their efforts to kill off the talks, with potentially drastic consequences

Iran nuclear talks extension raises risk of cataclysmic failure 

 Those who oppose a deal can be expected to step up their efforts to kill off the talks, with potentially drastic consequences 

Monday 24 November 2014 10.20 EST

GUARDIAN

 The longer the international standoff over Iran’s suspect nuclear programme continues, the more dangerous and volatile the situation becomes. All seven countries involved in Monday’s last-gasp negotiations in Vienna understood this, which is why they strove so hard and so long to forge a comprehensive agreement. 

 By extending the talks again they have avoided a total collapse, but they have also raised the stakes, ensuring that failure, if that is what eventually transpires, will be all the more cataclysmic. 

 The governments and leaders favouring a deal did not exactly lose in Vienna, but it is clear who came out ahead – the conservative rejectionists and clerical last-ditchers who dominate Tehran’s political establishment, parliament and media; the mostly Republican hardliners in the US congress who oppose an agreement at any price; Israel’s leadership and the Gulf Arab monarchies, who distrust everything Tehran says; and Islamist Sunni extremists in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere, who exploit differences between Shia Iran and the west to pursue their vicious hegemonist fantasies. 

 Negotiators representing the Obama administration, Britain and European governments can justifiably claim important progress has been made in narrowing gaps in the nine months that followed last year’s interim agreement. Of greater significance, however, is the sense that a window briefly opened after the 2013 election of the centrist Hassan Rouhani as Iran’s president is closing, and that a unique opportunity for a historic rapprochement has been, or is about to be missed. 

 Those opposing a deal can now be expected to intensify their efforts to kill the extended talks, while simultaneously blaming supposed Iranian intransigence and bad faith, and the naivety of Barack Obama and other western leaders, for the failure to achieve a breakthrough. Their argument is that a safe, sustainable and effective nuclear deal with Iran was always an impossible dream, and the latest failure to agree simply proves that contention. 

 “This camp believes that a deal, should it be reached, will enshrine Iran’s right to a nuclear programme in international law – an idea it finds an anathema,” said analyst Jeffrey Goldberg. “It thinks that Iran, once sanctions are lifted, will rebuild its economy and then ignore its nuclear obligations. 

It believes that the Iranian government is probably already cheating and obfuscating in its effort to go nuclear, and will redouble these efforts once a deal is signed. This group thinks that sanctions, combined with the credible threat of force, are the only means to keep Iran from going nuclear.” The alternative could be worse, Goldberg said: “The collapse of negotiations could move Iran and the west quickly towards confrontation that could end in disaster, and could set Iran on the fast and steady path to the nuclear threshold. 

There are no fail-safe choices here.” The possible negative consequences of a continuing impasse or total collapse of the negotiations include the following:

 • The newly installed and Republican-controlled US congress, which takes office in January, could impose a new tranche of sanctions. The push for new measures, tightening financial and economic curbs on Iran and targeting its links with Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon, would be as much about domestic US politics as international policy as battle-lines are drawn with the much-weakened Obama administration ahead of the 2016 presidential election 
 • The pressure inside Iran to replace Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s west-friendly foreign minister, and other members of Tehran’s negotiating team as part of a larger effort to undermine Rouhani by his conservative opponents could become irresistible. The supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, cannot be expected to protect Rouhani. His support for the talks has always been lukewarm. In such circumstances, Iran could even withdraw previous concessions and harden its stance on its “nuclear rights”, enrichment and cooperation with the IAEA 
 • Increased sanctions-busting, principally by China, which is Iran’s largest oil customer, and Russia, which has agreed to build a new generation of nuclear reactors in Iran. A senior Iranian official was quoted this month as saying that Tehran could play the “eastern” card. “We have always had good relations with Russia and China. Naturally, if the nuclear talks fail, we will increase our cooperation with our friends and will provide them more opportunities in Iran’s high-potential market,” the official said. “We share common views [with Russia and China] on many issues, including Syria and Iraq.” Such a scenario would destroy the UN security council consensus on Iran policy 
 • Israeli military action against Iran, egged on by US neo-conservatives and the Gulf Arab monarchies, principally Saudi Arabia, becomes more likely the longer the impasse continues. Israel’s prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, has distracted attention from the Palestinian question by using the spectre of a nuclear-armed Iran to rally domestic opinion and silence foreign critics. Obama has warned him off, but he reserves the right to take matters into his own hands in the interests of Israel’s security 
 • Any Israeli military action against supposed Iranian nuclear targets, however limited, could quickly suck in the Saudis and US forces in Bahrain, which might become the object of Iranian retaliation. Any such confrontation could also see Iran attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off western oil supplies and threatening a new global economic crisis 
 • The longer the negotiating process continues without results, the less likely that benefits accruing from a breakthrough will materialise. Such benefits potentially include the opening of Iran’s vast domestic market of 76 million people to western products, trade, travel and investment, the emergence of Iran as an alternative to Russia as a major oil and gas supplier to Europe, cooperation with the west in addressing regional problems such as Islamic State terrorism and the Syrian civil war, an exemplary success for international nuclear non-proliferation efforts, a prospective liberalisation of Iranian society and an end to Iran’s deeply damaging 35-year political, cultural and human isolation.

Netanyahu takes the steps to officiate the Apartheid State of Israel

INSTITUTIONALIZED APARTHEID  IS ALREADY THE PRACTICE:



Israeli cabinet approves legislation defining nation-state of Jewish people 


Opponents say proposed law would reserve ‘national rights’ for Jews and not for minorities that make up 20% of population 

Binyamin Netanyahu The Israeli PM, Binyamin Netanyahu, argues the law is needed because the notion of Israel as a Jewish homeland was being challenged. 

Peter Beaumont in Jerusalem Sunday 23 November 2014 14.08 EST 

GUARDIAN

 A controversial bill that officially defines Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people has been approved by cabinet despite warnings that the move risks undermining the country’s democratic character. Opponents, including some cabinet ministers, said the new legislation defined reserved “national rights” for Jews only and not for its minorities, and rights groups condemned it as racist.

The bill, which is intended to become part of Israel’s basic laws, would recognise Israel’s Jewish character, institutionalise Jewish law as an inspiration for legislation and delist Arabic as a second official language. Arab Muslims and Christians make up 20% of Israel’s population. The cabinet passed the bill by a 14-7 majority after reports of rancorous exchanges during the meeting, including between the prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, and his justice minister, Tzipi Livni. 

The bill, which still requires the Knesset’s approval to become a law, comes as tensions between Israelis and Palestinians rise sharply, and friction within Israel’s Arab minority grows. Opponents include two of the more centrist parties in Netanyahu’s fragile coalition - which say the bill is being pushed through with forthcoming primaries in the prime minster’s rightwing Likud party in mind - and senior government officials including the attorney general. 

According to many critics, the new wording would weaken the wording of Israel’s declaration of independence, which states that the new state would “be based on the principles of liberty, justice and freedom expressed by the prophets of Israel [and] affirm complete social and political equality for all its citizens, regardless of religion, race or gender”. 

Among those to voice their opposition was the finance minister, Yair Lapid, who said he had spoken to the family of Zidan Saif, a Druze policeman killed in last week’s deadly attack on a Jerusalem synagogue. “What will we tell his family? That he is a second-class citizen in the state of Israel because someone has primaries in the Likud?” he asked. 

Netanyahu argued that the law was necessary because people were challenging the notion of Israel as a Jewish homeland. “There are many who are challenging Israel’s character as the national state of the Jewish people. The Palestinians refuse to recognise this and there is also opposition from within. “There are those, including those who deny our national rights, who would like to establish autonomy in the Galilee and the Negev. “Neither do I understand those who are calling for two states for two peoples but who also oppose anchoring this in law. They are pleased to recognise a Palestinian national state but strongly oppose a Jewish national state.” 

According to reports in the Hebrew media, the attorney general, Yehuda Weinstein, has also expressed concern, shared by some ministers, that the new law would effectively give greater emphasis to Israel’s Jewish character at the expense of its democratic nature. A number of Israeli basic laws use the term “Jewish and democratic”, giving equal weight to both. The new law would enshrine only the Jewish character of the state. 

Netanyahu appeared to confirm that there would be differential rights for Israeli Jews and other minorities. He said that while all could enjoy equal civil rights, “there are national rights only for the Jewish people - a flag, anthem, the right of every Jew to immigrate to Israel and other national symbols.” 

Cabinet ministers, including Netanyahu, separately proposed stripping Palestinian attackers of their residency rights in occupied East Jerusalem in response to a wave of deadly violence. “It cannot be that those who harm Israel, those who call for the destruction of the state of Israel, will enjoy rights like social security,” Netanyahu said, adding that the measure would complement house demolitions and serve as a deterrent. 

Critics, however, have condemned the measures as racist said that they could further escalate tensions. 

The cabinet met as fresh reports of continuing violence emerged. In Gaza, the Palestinian health ministry said Israeli forces had shot dead a Palestinian on Sunday, the first such fatality since a 50-day Gaza war ended in August. In the West Bank, a Palestinian home was torched on Sunday. No one was hurt in the fire, which gutted the home in the village of Khirbet Abu Falah near Ramallah, local residents said. “The settlers came here and they hit the door, but I refused to open,” said Huda Hamaiel, who owns the house. She said they then broke a terrace window and hurled a petrol bomb inside. “Death to Arabs” and another slogan calling for revenge were also painted on the walls of Hamaiel’s home, hallmarks of Jewish extremists’ so-called “price tag” attacks against Palestinian dwellings and mosques and Christian church property.

Failure to reach a nuclear deal will drive Iran into Russia’s arms

As relations between the US and Russia deteriorate, Tehran has the scope to become an evermore decisive and divisive factor

• By Ariane Tabatabai
• Published: 20:00 November 22, 2014 Gulf News

Tehran and Moscow, facing similar political and economic pressures from the West, have developed strong ties since the Islamic Revolution. More recently, as relations between the US and Moscow have soured, the links have only intensified. But for Tehran, closer ties to Moscow are not so much a choice as the only viable option — and in the run-up to the deadline for a comprehensive international deal on the Iranian nuclear programme, Moscow’s influence looms dangerously large. Decisions made in the next few days by the US, China, France, the UK and Russia, plus Germany (the “P5+1”) and Iran, will determine whether that remains the case.

In fact, Iran’s interests today, as in the past, overlap more with those of the US than either side is willing to admit. It is true that since the 1979 revolution turned Iran from Washington’s ally to one of its most vocal opponents, Moscow has stepped into the void. The two countries co-operate on strategic matters including energy, technology, aerospace, defence and trade.

Moscow provides military equipment Iran cannot procure from the West, and also assists in civilian arenas. It is Iran’s sole nuclear partner, supplying technology and fuel. It stepped in when the West left the Bushehr nuclear power plant unfinished after the revolution. The two countries have recently concluded a deal to construct two further plants. US and Iranian interests are aligned in much of the Middle East. Yet in a number of areas they are unwilling to co-operate. As Tehran engages with the world powers on its nuclear dossier, domestic politics allow little scope also to co-operate openly with the West on regional security issues. For Washington, domestic constituencies such as a Republican-controlled Congress — and regional allies including Israel and Saudi Arabia — are expressing concern at the idea of the US striking a “bad deal” in order to tackle the issue of Daesh (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) in co-operation with Iran.

Meanwhile, Tehran and Moscow are creating an axis of their own, and co-operating to push Daesh back. They have begun co-operating in Iraq. They are also on the same team — that of President Bashar Al Assad — on the Syrian civil war. They pledged at the 2014 Caspian Sea Summit not to let foreign powers intervene in the region, limiting Nato’s ability to deploy forces. Subsequently they conducted joint military drills in the area. To overcome sanctions, they are developing a plan to replace the US dollar with their national currencies in bilateral trade.

Iran is not forging closer ties with Russia because it believes Moscow is a viable, trustworthy partner, however. During the pro-reform protests that followed the disputed 2009 presidential election, the revolutionary slogan “death to America” gave way to “death to Russia”, reflecting frustration at substandard technology believed to be endangering lives. Tehran’s insistence on developing indigenous nuclear technology and becoming self-sufficient stems from this. Iranians believe their country can neither meet its needs on the global market nor rely on Russia. This isolation has left Tehran no option but to turn to Moscow. And, as relations between the US and Russia have deteriorated, the state has the scope to become an evermore decisive and divisive factor. Failure to reach a comprehensive deal on Iran’s nuclear programme, and to lay the path for more normal economic and political relations with the world, would propel Tehran into Moscow’s arms. It would foster an even more powerful Russian-Iranian axis. This would be worrying for opponents of a deal on Capitol Hill, most of whom also do not want Russian influence to grow. By blocking the way to a deal, they could facilitate and accelerate what they want to prevent.

— Financial Times 

Ariane Tabatabai is an associate with the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Israeli is evolving from a liability to the US to an outright threat to US security

Exclusive: Cornered but unbound by nuclear pact, Israel reconsiders military action against Iran

Israeli official cites "sunset clause" in proposed comprehensive deal, which guarantees Iran a path into the nuclear club and may corner Israel into war.

WASHINGTON –  Historic negotiations with Iran will reach an inflection point on Monday, as world powers seek to clinch a comprehensive deal that will, to their satisfaction, end concerns over the nature of its vast, decade-old nuclear program.

But sharing details of the deal under discussion with The Jerusalem Post on the eve of the deadline, Israel has issued a stark, public warning to its allies with a clear argument: Current proposals guarantee the perpetuation of a crisis, backing Israel into a corner from which military force against Iran provides the only logical exit.

The deal on the table

World powers have presented Iran with an accord that would restrict its nuclear program for ten years and cap its ability to produce fissile material for a weapon during that time to a minimum nine-month period.

Should Tehran agree, the deal may rely on Russia to convert Iran's current uranium stockpile into fuel rods for peaceful use. The proposal would also include an inspection regime that would attempt to follow the program's entire supply chain, from the mining of raw material to the syphoning of that material to various nuclear facilities across Iran.

Israel's leaders believe the best of a worst-case scenario, should that deal be reached, is for inspections to go perfectly and for Iran to choose to abide by the deal for the entire decade-long period.

But "our intelligence agencies are not perfect," an Israeli official said. "We did not know for years about Natanz and Qom. And inspection regimes are certainly not perfect. They weren't in the case in North Korea, and it isn't the case now – Iran's been giving the IAEA the run around for years about its past activities."

"What's going to happen with that?" the official continued. "Are they going to sweep that under the rug if there's a deal?"

On Saturday afternoon, reports from Vienna suggested the P5+1 – the US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany – are willing to stop short of demanding full disclosure of any secret weapon work by Tehran.

Speaking to the Post, a senior US official rejected concern over limited surveillance capabilities, during or after a deal.

"If we can conclude a comprehensive agreement, we will have significantly more ability to detect covert facilities – even after its duration is over – than we do today," the senior US official said. "After the duration of the agreement, the most intrusive inspections will continue: the Additional Protocol – which encompasses very intrusive transparency, and which Iran has already said it will implement – will continue."

But compounding Israel's fears, the proposal Jerusalem has seen shows that mass dismantlement of Iran's nuclear infrastructure – including the destruction, and not the mere warehousing, of its parts – is no longer on the table in Vienna.

"Iran's not being asked to dismantle the nuclear infrastructure," the Israeli official said, having seen the proposal before the weekend. "Right now what they're talking about is something very different. They're talking about Ayatollah Khamenei allowing the P5+1 to save face."

Officials in the Netanyahu government are satisfied that their ideas and concerns have been given a fair hearing by their American counterparts. They praise the US for granting Israel unprecedented visibility into the process.

But while those discussions may have affected the talks at the margins, large gaps – on whether to grant Iran the right to enrich uranium, or allow it to keep much of its infrastructure – have remained largely unaddressed.

"It's like the chemical weapons deal in Syria," the official said. "They didn't just say: Here, let's get rid of the stockpile and the weapons, but we will leave all the plants and assembly lines."

'Sunset clause'

Yet, more than any single enforcement standard or cap included in the deal, Israel believes the Achilles' heel of the proposed agreement is its definitive end date – the sunset clause.

"You've not dismantled the infrastructure, you've basically tried to put limits that you think are going to be monitored by inspectors and intelligence," said the official, "and then after this period of time, Iran is basically free to do whatever it wants."

The Obama administration also rejects this claim. By e-mail, the senior US administration official said that, "'following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its duration, the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT – with an emphasis on non-nuclear weapon."

"That has in no way changed," the American official continued, quoting the interim Joint Plan of Action reached last year.

But the treatment of Iran as any other signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty –189 countries are members, including Iran – would allow Tehran to ultimately acquire "an industrial-sized capability," the Israelis say. "The breakout times [to a nuclear weapon] will be effectively zero."

Israel and world powers seek to maximize the amount of time they would have to identify non-compliance from a nuclear deal, should Iran choose to defy its tenets and build a bomb.

But in the deal under discussion in Vienna, Iran would be able to comply with international standards for a decade and, from Israel's perspective, then walk, not sneak, into the nuclear club.

"You've not only created a deal that leaves Iran as a threshold nuclear power today, because they have the capability to break out quickly if they wanted to," the Israeli official contended. "But you've also legitimized Iran as a military nuclear power in the future."

From the moment this deal is clinched, Israel fears it will guarantee Iran as a military nuclear power. There will be no off ramp, because Iran's reentry into the international community will be fixed, a fait accompli, by the very powers trying to contain it.

"The statement that says we've prevented them from having a nuclear weapon is not a true statement," the Israeli official continued. "What you've said is, you're going to put restrictions on Iran for a given number of years, after which there will be no restrictions and no sanctions. That's the deal that's on the table."

Revisiting the use of force

Without an exit ramp, Israel insists its hands will not be tied by an agreement reached this week, this month or next, should it contain a clause that ultimately normalizes Iran's home-grown enrichment program.

On the surface, its leadership dismisses fears that Israel will be punished or delegitimized if it disrupts an historic, international deal on the nuclear program with unilateral military action against its infrastructure.

By framing the deal as fundamentally flawed, regardless of its enforcement, Israel is telling the world that it will not wait to see whether inspectors do their jobs as ordered.

"Ten, fifteen years in the life of a politician is a long time," the Israeli said, in a vague swipe against the political directors now scrambling in Vienna. "In the life of a nation, it's nothing."

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has threatened the use of force against Iran several times since 2009, even seeking authorization from his cabinet in 2011. Iran's program has since grown in size and scope.

According to his aides, the prime minister's preference is not war, but the continuation of a tight sanctions regime on Iran's economy coupled with a credible threat of military force. Netanyahu believes more time under duress would have led to an acceptable deal. But that opportunity, in his mind, may now be lost.

Whether Israel still has the ability to strike Iran, without American assistance, is an open question. Quoted last month in the Atlantic magazine, US officials suggested that window for Netanyahu closed over two years ago.

But responding to claims by that same official, quoted by Jeffrey Goldberg, over Netanyahu's courage and will, the Israeli official responded sternly: "The prime minister is a very serious man who knows the serious responsibility that rests on his shoulders. He wouldn't say the statements that he made if he didn't mean them."

“People have underestimated Israel many, many times in the past," he continued, "and they underestimate it now."

JERUSALEM POST

ISIS job security ain't what it used to be

George Galloway isn't taking any prisoners either:



Who is Katie Hopkins, you ask?

The Immigration System is Broken - Obama Takes the Pragmatic Choice and Asks for Reason and Congress to Act

Obama’s Immigration Action: Probably Legal but Also Unprecedented, Productive Policy but Troublesome Politics

Peter Suderman|Nov. 20, 2014 1:36 pm

In a primetime announcement this evening, President Obama will explain and defend the details of a sweeping executive action designed to keep roughly four million unauthorized immigrants from deportation and provide them with legal status to work.

Some of the particulars remain unclear, but the basic outlines of the plan have been known for months: Obama will use enforcement discretion to redirect law enforcement activities, prioritizing deportation of unauthorized immigrants who have additional criminal records. (You can read the White House’s talking points here.) Republicans have called the move unprecedented and illegal, while the administration, which seems to be prodding Republicans with the move, has argued that it is well within political norms.

As a supporter of expanded immigration and also someone who worries about executive overreach, I think there are partial truths in the arguments made by both sides. And while it seems to me that there are some policy advantages in the executive maneuver, there may also be longer-term political and practical disadvantages to consider as well. 

Obama’s move would probably be legal. For the last several months, conservatives and Republicans have issued increasingly apocalyptic denouncements of the Obama’s proposed action, describing it as a massive legal overreach by the executive. The most compelling comments to this effect, however, came not from the right but from Obama himself, who for years has repeatedly insisted that the sort of enforcement-related order he is expected to announce tonight would be beyond his authority. The White House is now suggesting that Obama has not changed his position, just his emphasis, but as The Wahington Post’s Glenn Kessler lays out in great detail, the record is quite clear: Obama said on multiple occasions that the president did not have the power to unilaterally legalize entire populations of immigrants who are not at risk due to unusual circumstances.

But if the last few years have proven anything it’s that the law isn’t necessarily what Obama says it is. As Reason’s Shikha Dalmia and Case Western Reserve University Law Professor Jonathan Adler have noted, the president has a great deal of authority to set enforcement priorities and exercise discretion when it comes to immigration law. Even some of the loudest critics of Obama’s action have come around to the idea that, at least technically, it would not exceed the president’s discretionary power, even if it would constitute an unusual and strained use of it. 

It would also be unprecedented. The administration and some of its supporters are arguing that various presidents, including Republicans, have taken comparable steps before, limiting deportations through executive order, and that makes this well within political norms. This argument leaves out crucial details about congressional involvement and support for those previous presidential orders. 

In 1987, under President Ronald Reagan, the immigration commissioner announced that children of parents who had been granted amnesty under a 1986 immigration law would be granted protection from deportation. A few years later, President George H.W. Bush granted protection to entire families, a move that followed action in the Senate, and that was passed by the entire Congress the following year. 

Supporters of the president note specifically that Bush, Sr.’s move offered protection to about 40 percent of the nation’s undocumented immigrants at the time, roughly the same percentage as Obama’s move is expected to legalize. But in raw numbers, Obama’s move is expected to have a much bigger impact, granting legal status to about 4 million immigrants instead of the 1.5 million protected under Bush. 

And politically, the actions by Bush, Sr. and Reagan just aren't equal, because both came in the context of clear congressional support for action on immigration. Reagan’s followed a large-scale amnesty law, and Bush’s followed Senate action that would soon become passed by the full Congress.

It would represent a further expansion of executive power, and norms around using it. Just because an executive action is technically legal does not mean that it falls within legal norms, and executive power can be expanded not only through explicit assertions of previously off-limits authority, but by making use of powers that existed but were never used, or never used to such an extent. This strikes me as a case of the latter, especially given the president’s multitude of statements indicating that the power to legalize so many immigrants is beyond his office, and the stated reasoning for his change of heart: that Congress has not acted. When Congress declines to pass a law that the president would like to see passed, that does not give him an excuse to act. As President Obama himself declared in 2011, his job is to “enforce and implement” the laws that Congress makes, not to use his authority to circumvent those laws when he sees fit. Anyone who worries about executive overreach, even those supportive of expanded immigration, ought to be wary of the precedent this move, and the thin line of reasoning behind it, could set.

On a strictly policy basis, Obama’s executive action might be preferable to a big reform bill. If you favor making immigration easier and more straightforward, and think that draconian enforcement efforts are both wasteful and counterproductive, then there are real upsides to executive action when compared to a big congressional overhaul. A major reform bill would massively increase funding for border patrols, despite years of increased funding for border security and little to show for it and the fact that close to half of illegal immigrants came here legally and then overstayed their visas. A comprehensive immigration reform plan would almost certainly include some sort of E-Verify system, an incredibly invasive form of workplace nannying which would create huge hassles for workers and employers, as well as large numbers of false positives—making hiring, and finding employment, an even harder process than it already is.

But unilateral executive action could poison support for broader, more stable reform.There’s no question that the immediate political consequence would be to further outrage Republicans, and turn a party that has long had a mix of views about the virtues of expanding immigration into one dominated by opposition. In fact, this seems to be part of what the administration wants—to provoke Republicans into a frothing rage, in hopes that they will do something politically stupid as a result. (They might oblige.) 

But the backlash might not just be the immediate consequence, and it might not just be limited to the congressional GOP and its core supporters; unilateral action might result in a deepened long-term opposition to greater immigration as well. 

One only need to look at the political dynamic in the years since the passage of Obamacare, another ambitious policy passed with no opposition party support and a wary public. Democrats hoped it would provide a path to political victory, but the actual result was a deep and enduring public opposition that has cost Democrats in multiple elections.

Similar to Obamacare, about 48 percent of the public disapproves of Obama’s proposed action, while just 38 percent say they support the move. And similar to Obamacare, the president's actions are making some Democrats nervous too. And just as before, supporters are arguing that opposition will blow over quickly. 

I wouldn't bet on it. Unprecedented, unpopular, large-scale, unilateral policy changes are nearly certain to produce a backlash—against the president, against his party, and against the ideas at the heart of the policy change itself.

To me, this is the most significant risk of Obama’s plan—that it will create a backlash, not only amongst congressional Republicans, but within the public at large, a backlash that makes it more difficult to achieve a stable, legal, and politically viable system of expanded and simplified immigration, one that is not dependent on a sympathetic executive or enforcement discretion, but that is codified in law and agreed upon by enough of the country’s residents and legislators.

This is not to simply condemn Obama’s plan, but instead to warn enthusiastic supporters that the choice to act at this time, in this way, without legislative backing or public support, might be satisfying in the moment, but also stands a real chance of closing off opportunities for a better, more lasting solution at some point in the future. Consensus is hard, and sometimes it seems impossible, but in politics, it’s also important. 

Peter Suderman is a senior editor at Reason magazine.

Fiction: Israel’s assertion that it is a strategic asset for the United States - Fact: U.S. suffers politically in the ME because of Israeli activities, including the building of illegal settlements in the West Bank

Why Israel Opposes a Final Nuclear Deal with Iran and What to Do About It

By contributors | Nov. 19, 2014 |

• 
  

By Robert E. Hunter 

WASHINGTON, Nov 18 2014 (IPS) – Nov. 24 is the deadline for six world powers and Iran to reach a final deal over its nuclear programme. If there is no deal, then the talks are likely to be extended, not abandoned.

But as I learned from more than three decades’ work on Middle East issues, in and out of the U.S. government, success also depends on Israel no longer believing that it needs a regional enemy shared in common with the United States to ensure Washington’s commitment to its security.

Much is at stake in the negotiations with Iran in Vienna, notably the potential removal of the risk of war over its nuclear programme and the removal of any legitimate basis for Israel’s fear that it could become the target of an Iranian bomb.

Success could also begin Iran’s reintegration into the international community, ending its lengthy quarantine. If President Barack Obama and his national security officials get their way, including the Pentagon—hardly a group of softies—a comprehensive final accord would be a good deal for U.S. national security and, in the American analysis, for Israel’s security as well.

Yet more is at issue for Israel, and for the Persian Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia. They want to keep Iran in purdah.

Indeed, since the Iranian Revolution ran out of steam outside its borders, the essential questions about the challenge Iran poses have been the following: Will it be able to compete for power and position in the region, and, how can Iran’s competition be dealt with?

The first response, led by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is to decry whatever might be agreed to in the talks, no matter how objectively good the results would be for everyone’s security. He has the Saudis and other Arab states as silent partners.

Between them, the Israeli and oil lobbies command a lot of attention in the U.S. Congress, a large part of whose members would otherwise accept that President Obama’s standard for an agreement meets the tests of both U.S. security and the security of its partners in the Middle East.

But a large fraction of Congress is no more willing to take on these two potent lobbies than the National Rifle Association.

Netanyahu will also do all he can to prevent the relaxation of any of the sanctions imposed on Iran. But even if he and his U.S. supporters succeed on Capitol Hill, President Obama can on his own suspend some of those sanctions—though exactly how much is being debated.

The U.S. does not have the last word on sanctions, however. The moment there is a final agreement, the floodgates of economic trade and investment with Iran will open. Europeans, in particular, are lined up with their order books, like Americans in 1889 who awaited the starter’s pistol to begin the Oklahoma land rush.

In response, U.S. private industry will ride up Capitol Hill to demand the relaxation of U.S.-mandated sanctions. Meanwhile, the sighs of relief resounding throughout the world will begin changing the international political climate concerning Iran.

Yet America’s concerns will not cease. While the U.S. and Iran have similar interests in opposing the Islamic State (ISIS or IS), and in wanting to see Afghanistan free from reconquest by of the Taliban, they are still far apart on other matters, notably the Assad regime in Syria, as well as Hezbollah and Hamas.

President Obama will also have an immediate problem in reassuring Israel and Gulf Arab states that American commitments to their security are sincere. To be sure, absent an Iranian nuclear weapon, there is no real Iranian military threat and all the Western weapons pumped into the Persian Gulf are thus essentially useless.

Iran’s real challenges emanate from its dynamic domestic economy, a highly educated, entrepreneurial culture that is matched in the region only by Israelis and Palestinians, and a good deal of cultural appeal even beyond Shi’a communities.

Obama thus faces a special problem in reassuring Israel, a problem that goes back decades. When the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was signed in 1979, the risks of a major Arab attack on Israel sank virtually to zero. So, too, did the risk of an Arab-Israeli conflict escalating to the level of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. All at once, U.S. and Israeli strategic concerns were no longer obviously linked.

Thus as soon as Israel withdrew from the Sinai in May 1979, then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin started searching for an alternative basis for linking American and Israeli strategic interests.

For him and for many other Israelis, then and now, it is not enough that the American people are firmly committed to Israel’s security for what could be called “sentimental” reasons: bonds of history (especially memories of the Holocaust), culture, religion, and the values of Western democracy.

But such “sentiment” is the strongest motivation for all U.S. commitments, a far stronger glue than strategic calculations that can and often do change, a fact that could be testified to by the people of South Vietnam and Afghanistan.

Yet for Begin and others, there had to be at least a strong similarity of strategic interests. Thus, in a meeting with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance the day after Egypt retook possession of the Sinai, Begin complained that the US had cancelled its “strategic dialogue” with Israel. Vance tasked me, as the National Security Council staff representative on his travelling team, to find out “what the heck Begin is talking about.”

I phoned Washington and got the skinny: the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment had been conducting a low-level dialogue with some Israeli military officers. Proving to be of little value, it was stopped.

The reason for Begin’s outburst thus became clear: in the absence of the strategic tie with the United States that had been provided by the conflict with Egypt, Israel needed something else, in effect, a common enemy.

That’s why many Israeli political stakeholders were ambivalent about the George W. Bush administration’s ambitions to topple Iraq’s Saddam Hussein: with his overthrow, a potential though remote threat to Israel would be removed, but so would the perception of a common enemy. Since Saddam’s ousting, Iran has gained even more importance for Israel as a means of linking Jerusalem’s strategic perceptions with those of Washington.

By the same political logic, Israel has always asserted that it is a strategic asset for the United States. As part of recognising Israel’s psychological needs, no U.S. official ever publicly challenges that Israeli assertion regardless of what they think in private or however much damage the U.S. might suffer politically in the region because of Israeli activities, including the building of illegal settlements in the West Bank.

So what must Obama do in order to eliminate the risk of an Iranian nuclear weapon, while also reassuring Israel of US fealty? On one side, to be able to honour an agreement with Iran, Obama has to undercut Netanyahu’s efforts with Congress to prevent any sanctions relief.

On the other side, he could reassure Israel through the classic means of buttressing the flow of arms, including the anti-missile capabilities of the Iron Dome that were so useful to Israel during the recent fighting in Gaza.

Israel would want even closer strategic cooperation with the U.S., including consultations on the full range of U.S. thinking and planning on all relevant issues in the Middle East. Israel (at least Netanyahu) would also want any notion of further negotiations with the Palestinians, and the relaxation of economic pressures on Gaza, put into the deep freeze—where, in effect, they already are.

Israel has an inherent, sovereign right to defend itself and to make, for and by itself, calculations about what that means. (The country is not unified, however: a surprising number of former leaders of the Israeli military and security agencies have publicly differed with Netanyahu’s pessimistic assessments of the Iranian threat).

As Israel’s only real friend in the world, the United States continues to have an obligation, within reason, to reassure Israel about its security and safety.

For Obama, this reassurance to Israel is a price worth paying in the event of a deal, which would be at least one step in trying to build security and stability in an increasingly turbulent Middle East. But that can only happen if Israel refrains from obstructing Obama’s effort to make everyone, including Israel, more secure.

Robert E. Hunter, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, was director of Middle East Affairs on the National Security Council Staff in the Carter administration and in 2011-12 was director of Transatlantic Security Studies at the National Defense University. Read his work on IPS’s foreign policy blog, LobeLog.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, IPS-Inter Press Service.

Edited by Kitty Stapp

Licensed from Inter Press Service