The New York Times has published two letters that the Times uses to assert that Bush was aware of Bremer's intent to dissolve the Iraq Army, and approved it.
The critical line in this story is this:..."I will parallel this step with an even more robust measure dissolving Saddam's military and intelligence structures to emphasize that we mean business. We are seeing signs that the outlawed organizations are behind some of the street violence here."...
I do not believe this is the same thing as saying..."we will disband the army." On the other hand, it would have been a good idea to get a clarification of Bremer's intent. Surely the US military should have spoken up when the notice to disband the Iraqi Army was issued, but to say Bush was aware of the plan based on this letter is IMO, a stretch.
Letter from L. Paul Bremer to George W. Bush, May 22, 2003
This letter was drafted on May 20, 2003 and sent to the president on May 22 through Donald H. Rumsfeld, then secretary of defense. NY Times
May 22, 2003
From: Paul Bremer
To: The President of the United States
Through: The Secretary of Defense
Mr. President:
After a week on the ground, I thought it might be useful to give you my first impressions of the situation here. We have two important goals in this immediate period. We must make it clear to everyone that we mean business: that Saddam and the Baathists are finished. And we must show the average Iraqi that his life will be better.
I have now visited cities in the North and South and have traveled around Baghdad every day, speaking often to Iraqis on the streets or in stores. As I have moved around, there has been an almost universal expression of thanks to the US and to you in particular for freeing Iraq from Saddam's tyranny. In the northern town of Mosul yesterday, an old man, under the impression that I was President Bush (he apparently has poor TV reception), rushed up and planted two very wet and hairy kisses on my cheeks.( Such events confirm the wisdom of the ancient custom of sending emissaries to far away lands).
No doubt you have seen reports of demonstrations criticizing America. But these relate almost entirely to the continued lack of order (which is largely a Baghdad phenomenon) and basic services. No one publicly supports Saddam.
The dissolution of his chosen instrument of political domination, the Baath Party, has been very well received. Several Iraqis have told me, literally with tears in their eyes, that they have waited 30 years for this moment. While the resulting dismissal of public servants has caused some inefficiencies and griping, in most cases younger civil servants have expressed pleasure, even joy, at the measure. (At a minimum they are attracted to the prospect of promotion opportunities.) I will parallel this step with an even more robust measure dissolving Saddam's military and intelligence structures to emphasize that we mean business. We are seeing signs that the outlawed organizations are behind some of the street violence here.
We will combine these declaratory policies with vigorous steps to impose law and order on the streets of Baghdad. This, far more than the much-discussed evolution of political structures, is what dominates the life of the average urban resident. General McKiernan and I are cooperating closely to increase the visible presence of police and armed forces on the streets. People must no longer fear to send their children to school or their wives to work.
Restoring law and order is a necessary but insufficient condition for success. We face a series of urgent issues involving the restoration of basic services. We have made great progress under Jay Garner's leadership. Iraqis in the north and south have more electricity, and residents of Basra have more water, than they had before the war. In Baghdad our priority remains getting electricity back to prewar levels, for on it also depend the water and sewer systems.
I have relaunched the political dialogue with Iraqi leaders. My message is that full sovereignty under an Iraqi government can come after democratic elections, which themselves must be based on a constitution agreed by all the people. This process will take time. Patience will be a virtue (though evidence of it is thus far lacking). At the same time, I am stressing that we are prepared to move that process as quickly as the Iraqis provided it is one that leads to a representative government at peace with its neighbors.
Our immediate goal will be to arrange a National Conference this summer which will set in motion the writing of a constitution, and reform of the judicial, legal and economic systems. As the Iraqis are progressively more prepared to assume responsibility, we would be prepared to give it to them. But we must be firm and clear: a legitimate sovereign Iraqi government must be built on a well-prepared base.
Respectfully,
Jerry Bremer
Baghdad
May 20, 2003
Letter from George W. Bush to L. Paul Bremer, May 23, 2003
THE PRESIDENT
CRAWFORD, TEXAS
May 23, 2003
The Honorable L. Paul Bremer
Administrator
Coalition Provisional Authority
Baghdad
Dear Jerry:
Thank you for your May 22nd letter. Your leadership is apparent. You have quickly made a positive and significanti mpact. You have my full support and confidence. You also have the backing of our Administration that knows our work will take time. We will fend off the impatient as you and your team steadily improve the lives of the Iraqi people.
I am told living conditions for ORHA are terrible. Improve them quickly so decisions are sound and life is bearable.
All my best.
Sincerely,
George W. Bush
The Editorial/Headline Writing Team distorts their own paper's story, just as Jerry Bremmer distorts his own place in history.
ReplyDeleteEnvoy’s Letters Counter Bush on Dismantling of Iraq Army
But the letters, combined with Mr. Bush’s comments, suggest confusion within the administration about what quickly proved to be a decision with explosive repercussions.
Indeed, Mr. Bremer’s letter to Mr. Bush is striking in its almost nonchalant reference to a major decision that a number of American military officials in Iraq strongly opposed. Some senior administration officials, including the secretary of state at the time, Colin L. Powell, have reportedly said subsequently that they did not know about the decision ahead of time.
Gen. Peter Pace, then the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations in February 2004 that the decision to disband the Iraqi Army was made without the input of the joint chiefs. “We were not asked for a recommendation or for advice,” he said.
The reference from Mr. Bremer’s note to Mr. Bush is limited to one sentence at the end of a lengthy paragraph in a three-page letter. The letter devoted much more space to recounting what Mr. Bremer described as “an almost universal expression of thanks” from the Iraqi people “to the U.S. and to you in particular for freeing Iraq from Saddam’s tyranny.”
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ReplyDeleteThere was indeed much confusion about many things in the administration. Concerns were raised by the MSM about the War between Powell and Rumsfeld and Cheney, but Mr Rogers, aka GWB assured us all that it was all good, that he, the decider would benefit from listening to all views and then policy would be finalized.
ReplyDeleteIn fact, policy was repeatedly changed in planning and execution, the result looking as if there had been no coherent policy at all.
Garner says here he expected to stay about 3 months. A General on his team figured it would be longer.
ReplyDeleteGarner was then unceremoniously relieved the next month by Jerry Bremmer, DOD's plans went down the Crapper, and Viceroy Bremmer prepared the field for the Insurgency.
---
The Americans who will run Iraq
!
Once US-led military operations in Iraq are over, the country will be ruled by an American administrator for an undefined period of time. An agency set up under the auspices of the US Defense Department is starting to take charge of civilian matters for the foreseeable future.
A 200-strong team of former US military and other government agency personnel, humanitarian workers and Iraqi experts have assembled under the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.
Jay Garner profile
The man in charge is retired American General Jay Garner, an old friend of US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. He will be, in effect, de facto ruler of Iraq in the immediate post-war period and answerable to US war commander General Tommy Franks, who has ultimate authority.
ORHA's mission is to provide humanitarian assistance, work on reconstructing Iraq and prepare for the eventual creation of an interim government by the Iraqis themselves.
General Garner's team, which also includes some British civil servants, is preparing to cross into Iraq to overhaul everything from the country's currency - which features the likeness of Saddam Hussein - to power supplies, legal code, police service and schools.
It will also have the considerable task of establishing democratic institutions in a country that has never known them.
Turf War Rages in Washington Over Who Will Rule Iraq
ReplyDeleteThe Bush administration was scrambling to finalize an interim government for post-war Iraq yesterday, amid a turf war pitting the Pentagon and the Vice-President's office against the State Department and Congress in Washington.
The battle concerns not only the American officials who will supervise the new ministries, but the role of exiled Iraqi leaders and the extent of United Nations involvement.
Above all, it is a struggle between Colin Powell's State Department and the Pentagon of Donald Rumsfeld, the Defense Secretary, and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, supported by Dick Cheney, the Vice-President.
With victory in Iraq in sight, the names of the Americans who will supervise new ministries to replace the existing 23in the crumbling regime of Saddam Hussein are still far from certain. Last week the Pentagon vetoed a State Department list of eight nominees, but whether the rejection is final is not clear.
In Kuwait, a group of potential US "ministers" is waiting to learn if it will be working under Jay Garner, a retired American general designated head of non-military operations in immediate post-war Iraq. These officials include former US ambassadors to Arab countries such as Barbara Bodine, a former envoy to Yemen, and Timothy Carney, who served in Sudan and Robert Reilly, a former director of the Voice of America radio station. A number of British officials are said to be working with them
Mr Reilly is said to be working with Iraqi exiles on broadcasting arrangements in the future Iraq. But other possible "ministers-in-waiting" have been marooned in Washington by the disputes between the Pentagon and the State Department.
A candidate to run the Information Ministry – at least in the eyes of the Pentagon faction – is James Woolsey, a former CIA director in the Clinton administration and among the earliest and most vocal advocates of force to topple President Saddam.
Mr Woolsey is also a strong supporter of Ahmed Chalabi, the most high profile of the Iraqi opposition leaders in exile, for an important role in post-war Iraq. But in recent days a new front in the Washington bureaucratic war has opened up over Mr Chalabi.
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ReplyDelete"Mr Rumsfeld, in an attempt to outmaneuver the State Department, which is deeply suspicious of Mr Chalabi, sent memos to President George Bush urging that an interim government led by exile leaders be set up in coalition- controlled southern Iraq, irrespective of what happened in Baghdad. Mr Rumsfeld's move is likely to meet powerful objections from the State Department, which doubts Mr Chalabi has much support inside a country he left as a child of 11 in 1956. "
ReplyDelete---
Hard to imagine that an interim govt in the then peaceful region of Southern Iraq, with guidance from folks who knew the language and culture, could possibly ailienated Sistani and the Shias as effectively as did Tone Deaf Viceroy Bremmer, entrusted with W's dreams for establishing a Jeffersonian Democracy on the Tigris.
"Ultimately the wrangling will probably have to be resolved by Mr Bush.
ReplyDeleteHis decisions will shape foreign perceptions of US intentions in Iraq.
They will also determine whether foreign policy is conducted by the State Department or its traditional rival department across the Potomac river. "
---
In practice, the decider did not act decisiveness, and DOD partly got it's way before being overruled by State.
"In practice, the decider did not act WITH decisiveness,"
ReplyDeleteLooking Beyond Saddam
ReplyDeleteThere has been constant division inside the Administration on preferred options.
Pentagon bosses want to get in and out fast. They must have cringed when Bush uttered Japan. That postwar rebuilding job took the U.S. seven years. That's not the model, insists the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith. "We would involve Iraqis as soon as possible, and we would transfer responsibility to Iraqi entities as soon as we could," he says.
Fierce interagency wrangling has pitted the State Department and the CIA against the Pentagon and the Vice President's office on issues large and small. Only on Jan. 20 did the Defense Department take charge of postwar operations in the new Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, naming Jay Garner, a retired Army lieutenant general and a friend of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's, as peace boss.
Garner, reporting to Franks, would take charge of all civilian matters. He would coordinate reconstruction and civil administration and quickly, Washington hopes, shift humanitarian assistance from the military to U.N. and nongovernmental agencies. Initially, there was talk of making a civilian top dog to take some of the onus off a military occupation. But a senior White House official tells TIME, "A civilian czar is not what people have in mind." The U.S. feels that one more link in the chain of command would weaken the effectiveness of the operation.
Garner and Franks would have total control of the country while the most critical decisions were made about its future. Administration officials tell TIME that the U.S. would place advisers in Iraqi ministries to link Garner's office directly to everyday affairs. Arab diplomats briefed on the plans disparage these advisers as communist-style commissars. But Washington says their role would be to help reform the Iraqi bureaucracy. Some of them might be Iraqi Americans, and all would bring to the job needed technical expertise and familiarity with Western democracy. Administration sources say they hope to give one Arab American a highly visible role: Lieut. General John Abizaid, one of the few in top rank to speak Arabic, was recently promoted to Franks' second deputy. Here's a sample of Garner's likely agenda:
Reforming Saddam's security forces...
Getting rid of Saddam's hidden army of spies, local operatives, snitches and cronies would be difficult and dangerous. Bush officials agree on the need for a cleansing process, but they're still debating how deep down the scouring should go.
ReplyDelete---
Bremmer:
"I will parallel this step with an even more robust measure dissolving Saddam's military and intelligence structures to emphasize that we mean business."
If we parse the words of Mr Bremmer's letter, checking them against his actions, the first line that jumps out
ReplyDeleteThe dissolution of his chosen instrument of political domination, the Baath Party, has been very well received.
dis·so·lu·tion (ds-lshn)
n.
1. Decomposition into fragments or parts; disintegration.
2. Indulgence in sensual pleasures; debauchery.
3. Termination or extinction by disintegration or dispersion: The dissolution of the empire was remarkably swift.
4. Extinction of life; death.
5. Annulment or termination of a formal or legal bond, tie, or contract.
6. Formal dismissal of an assembly or legislature.
7. Reduction to a liquid form; liquefaction.
So the meaning of dissolution seems pretty clear, even in diplo-speak. That the Baath Party had been terminated by disintegration or dispersion.
Which brings US to the next crucial line of the letter to Mr Bush.
:..."I will parallel this step with an even more robust measure dissolving Saddam's military and intelligence structures ..."
ro·bust (r-bst, rbst)
adj.
1. Full of health and strength; vigorous.
2. Powerfully built; sturdy. See Synonyms at healthy.
3. Requiring or suited to physical strength or endurance: robust labor.
4. Rough or crude; boisterous: a robust tale.
5. Marked by richness and fullness; full-bodied: a robust wine.
dis·solve (d-zlv)
v. dis·solved, dis·solv·ing, dis·solves
v.tr.
1. To cause to pass into solution: dissolve salt in water.
2. To reduce (solid matter) to liquid form; melt.
3. To cause to disappear or vanish; dispel.
4. To break into component parts; disintegrate.
5. To bring to an end by or as if by breaking up; terminate.
6. To dismiss (a legislative body, for example): dissolved parliament and called for new elections.
7. To cause to break down emotionally or psychologically; upset.
8. To cause to lose definition; blur; confuse: "Morality has finally been dissolved in pity" Leslie Fiedler.
9. Law To annul; abrogate.
So it seems to me that Mr Bremer is telling Mr Bush he plans on the vigorous termination of the Iraqi Army and Intelligence services.
To bring to an end by or as if by breaking up, to disentergrate and terminate.
Since the Iraqi Army had been destroyed and the survivors sent home by the US Army, few prisoners were taken in the advance to Baghdad, unlike the US esperience in Desert Storm. An experience General Franks did not want to duplicate, where tens of thousands of Iraqi were interred.
The conscripted soldiers of the Iraqi forces had gone home and the Command structure had all been the Baathist Party members, which had already been dissolved.
Mr Brener states that the outlawed organizations, the Baathists, to include the Army and Intel Services are behind some of the street violence here.
This the first reference to the "dead enders" of the Iraqi Army.
Mr Bremer's intent seems clear enough, to me.
Mr Bush responds to Mr Bremer, in a clear voice.
You have quickly made a positive and significant impact.
This would reference the dissolution of the Baathist Party, what Mr Bremer mentioned as his primary accomplishment, to date, in his letter.
You have my full support and confidence.
This would cover all the plans that Mr Bremer outlined in his letter.
That Mr Bush was so cavaliar on his endorsement of Bremer's plan of action, that neither the President nor Mr Rumsfeld consulted with the Joint Chiefs is not the responsibility of Mr Bremer.
He seems to have been subordinate to each, and in consultation with them.
Recieving their ... full support and confidence.
If there was a break down in communication, planning and implementation, it was at the White House and the Pentagon.
The buck stops at the Oval Office, not in the Green Zone.
One might think he might have penned the word "Army" if his intent was to be clear and unambiguous.
ReplyDeleteAt any rate, that there was a war inside the Admin is beyond dispute, and the Decider did not effectively mitigate it's deleterious effects.
Trish's Adamant Assertion that
"There WAS no other plan."
Is simply wrong.
"Indeed, Mr. Bremer’s letter to Mr. Bush is striking in its almost nonchalant reference to a major decision that a number of American military officials in Iraq strongly opposed. "
ReplyDelete---
And Powell and the Joint Chiefs were not made aware.
Mr Brener's use of military is all encompassing, to include those structures outside the Iraqi Army but still armed units, like the Air Force and Navy, also one would assume the para-military and militias that had been part of Saddam's power structure.
ReplyDeleteThe military and political power, in Iraq, was not concentrated in nor limited to, the Army.
Much like the SA was not in the formal command structure of the Reichswehr pr the SS part of the Wehrmacht.
"Army" would have been a noninclusive term, for the NAZI modeled Baathist military.
Mr Bremer did not work for Mr Powell or the Joint Chiefs, they were not in his Chain of Command.
ReplyDeleteMr Bremer worked for Mr Bush, directly and consulted with Mr Rumsfeld.
That Mr Bush did not keep Mr Powell or the Joint Chiefs informed, again, was not the responsibility of Mr Bremer.
Mr Bush decided who knew what, and when. Seems pretty clear who the Deciider is on Team 43. Mr Bush is sure of it, in no uncertain terms.
As well he should be, he was the man elected President by the Electoral College, twice.
Mr. Rumsfeld is out, but the problems remain
ReplyDeleteAlthough it hardly matters at this moment, a careful study of the history of the Iraq affair will show Mr. Rumsfeld one of the **least culpable** in the Administration for the U.S. landing in the Iraq tar pit.
It was Mr. Rumsfeld and Jay Garner, the retired general he appointed to manage post-war Iraq in 2003, who wanted only a very brief U.S. occupation and a rapid turnover to an Iraqi provisional government, the same procedure that was so successfully used in Afghanistan in 2001.
The intervention of the White House staff and L. Paul Bremer changed all of that.
Since that fateful change in strategy in the early summer of 2003, Mr. Rumsfeld has loyally soldiered on, dutifully implementing a policy he must not have been too happy with. In doing so, he tried to turn over responsibility to the Iraqis as soon as possible, the only way for America to extract itself from the tar pit.
This is why Mr. Rumsfeld has resisted calls for adding ever more American soldiers to Iraq.
---
But then, maybe Mr Westhawk simply does not know what he is talking about, like so many others.
". Seems pretty clear who the Deciider is on Team 43. Mr Bush is sure of it, in no uncertain terms"
ReplyDelete---
Feckless, and indecisive, but the decider nonetheless.
Authority can be delegated, Responsibility cannot.
ReplyDeleteFirst lesson taught at the Primary NCO Course.
What appplies to Corporals and Sergeants in the military applies to Generals, Ambassadors, Procounsels and Presidents.
I wish I had a copy of the old xerox about "The Phases of A Project." It was about how the team is formed and all goes well with everyone proudly taking credit until something goes wrong and the recriminations and the finger pointing start.
ReplyDeleteAll this talk, this tumult...
Everybody screwed up but nobody wants to accept responsibility for it. It's one thing to not own up to one's mistakes. It's worse when you blame others.
Intelligence agencies screwed up. State screwed up. Defense screwed up. The military screwed up. "Viceroy" Bremer screwed up. Jerry Garner would have screwed up if given the chance. Bush screwed up. So, acknowledging that, where do we go from here? Most of those characters are yesterday's news. Who's going to "step up" today?
Forward!
Someday I'll look up those quotes where the Cheery Mr Rogers assures us that all the hubbub the press keeps refering to is really
ReplyDeleteAll Good,
since he, the decider, uses it all to come to an informed decision.
...like a good MBA aspirant would.
---
Ignoring the fact that ego wars defy easy resolution, and Rodney King solutions are doomed to failure.
In his memoirs:
"Why didn't we just all get along?"
However, Whit,
ReplyDeletethose who ignore history are doomed to repeat it.
BC taught me that, if it taught me anything.
Look at Habu's comment in the last thread!
Bremmer, Garner, Rumsfeld, Powell, et al, were not the decider.
ReplyDeleteW was the decider.
Said so himself.
Since so many here have decided that the US Commanders are lying to US, as to the situation on the ground in Iraq, the question is, forward to what?
ReplyDeleteAt westhawk the newest thread relates to General P's staff reccomending that the Iraqi Government and Security Forces be considered hostile.
Which is a much more interesting meme than who did what, in 2003.
What is the objective, today?
First question that must be addressed before the way forward can be charted.
As we have arrived at the destination of the course charted in 2003 & 2004, and have found it lacking the amenities we desire.
Which was fore warned.
So General P agrees with Mr T?
ReplyDelete(otten)
At least this time, doug, habu that crazy redneck has not projected a launch date for the bombers to fly.
ReplyDeleteThough one assumes it'd have to be before 20 Jan. 2009.
The Staff, doug.
ReplyDeleteWe'll have to wait for 15 Sep to discover what General P believes.
Though many times leaks fore tell the tale.
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ReplyDelete"Thy rod and my staff, they comfort me"
ReplyDeleteL. Craig
---
But beyond American political maneuvering, the sequence listed above demonstrates that even when they are not mindful of it, the Americans and Iraq’s Sunni-Arabs are natural allies. Westhawk mentioned this in May 2006:
The Shi’ites increasingly want the Coalition gone so they can have a clearer path to running the government, or at least their autonomous region. For their part, the Sunnis have an incentive to stop attacking the Americans. They realize that the Americans are their only defense for now against the increasingly aggressive Iranians. When it comes to the Iranian threat, the U.S. and Iraq’s Sunnis (along with the Kurds and loyal Iraqi Shia) are natural allies. Just as they were in the 1980s.
A few weeks later, Sunni-Arab informers tipped off the Americans about Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s location, who was promptly killed by two American JDAMs.
Westhawk’s view on what to do about Iraq’s Sunni-Arabs has changed over time. In December 2006 I favored the “80% solution,” arguing that the U.S. government should drop political reconciliation, back the 80% Shi’ite-Kurdish majority, and isolate Iraq from Iranian influence. After observing the sharp turn-about by the Anbar tribes (a simple decision for self-preservation on their part), I then favored a “balance of power” approach for U.S. policy (see here and here).
As of August 31, 2007, the U.S. Defense Department reports that 2,946 U.S. servicemen were killed in action fighting the post-war Iraqi insurgency. A large majority of these were killed by Sunni-Arab insurgents. This fact is difficult to square with the idea that Americans and Iraq’s Sunni-Arabs are “natural allies.”
But America’s two principle objectives in Iraq seem eternal: to keep al Qaeda out and Iran to the east. The flurry of developments over the past week may mean that Mr. Bush and Anbar’s men are stowing away their emotions and stumbling into each other’s arms.
Westhawk's view has changed.
ReplyDelete---
W's view is unchanging.
(Mission Accomplished!
Stay the Course.)
except for when it does.
"Though one assumes it'd have to be before 20 Jan. 2009"
ReplyDelete---
Perhaps the Master Player has an Arrangement with Hillary to commence operations on the 21st.
Ya never know, in BC land.
Verification of Mr Lewis's thoughts on America as a friend.
ReplyDeleteTreacherous
Adjective: treacherous trechurus
Dangerously unstable and unpredictable
- unreliable
Tending to betray; especially having a treacherous character as attributed to the Carthaginians by the Romans
"the fiercest and most treacherous of foes"; "treacherous intrigues"
- punic, perfidious
habu's bestest expert, guess he'd know.
If he don't, who would?
ReplyDeleteCourse there's always Trish!
ReplyDelete;-)
Mr. Lewis would have given weight to the account of Gen Marshall selling out the Chinese Nationalistists, I would guess.
ReplyDeletea list is better than a lisp,
ReplyDeleteat least!
Global Storming
ReplyDeleteAlGore '08!
General Marshall, now there is a story, doug.
ReplyDeleteConsidered a treachorous traitor by some, but not President Truman.
Nor the Congress, nor history.
He implemented US policy, granted he helped to form those policies, but he was not the Decider.
This is exemplified by Mr Truman relieving General Macarthur, Mr Truman knew what his subordinates were doing, and when that was in variance with US policy, they were removed from positions of authority.
By definitionm Mr Marshall's actions in China, as in Europe, were the actions of the United States, not some rogue political actor.
That the outcomes of some of those policies were not pleasing, in retrospect, does not make him the traitorous fall guy. No indeed.
It was not Mr Marshall that failed the Nationalists in China, it was the United States. As in Vietnam and now, it seems, in Iraq.
If the US makes a 180 degree turn in Iraq, it will not be because of Mr Crocker or General P, no more so than not calling the Iraqi troops back to he barracks was Mr Bremer's sole decision.
It was the United States that decided, based upon our constitutional governments' form and structure.
Agreed.
ReplyDelete‘No one will talk to each other’
ReplyDelete* The day before Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, Bush was quiet during a video briefing from FEMA, in part because he was tired after an 80-minute bike ride.
* Secret Service agents have taken on the task of going to areas where Bush intends to visit, so they can find bike trails the president might find challenging. As Draper puts it, officials have “devoted inordinate energy to satisfying Bush’s need for biking trails.”
* Draper’s book says that John Roberts Jr., now the chief justice, was the one who recommended Harriet Miers’ nomination to the Supreme Court. Roberts’ office told the Post, “The account is not true.” (I can’t think of a reason why Roberts would recommend Miers, so I find the denial fairly compelling.)
---
2. On September 3rd, 2007 at 12:18 pm, Martin said:
* Rove didn’t want to see Bush invite Cheney onto the 2000 ticket: “Selecting Daddy’s top foreign-policy guru ran counter to message. It was worse than a safe pick — it was needy.”
So if only they had listened to Rove, we wouldn’t be in Iraq??? Combined with the Harriet Meirs shoutdown and Rove being stripped of power by Bolten, it sounds like there is some serious Rove reputation building going on in the background.
I don’t imagine Draper is a Bush syncophant, but after Woodward’s advetures in Bush acess, how can we begin to believe anything any of them say about anything?
Dennis - SGMM said:
ReplyDeleteIn the end, it will all be about deflecting blame from little George. His subordinates let him down: they gave him bad advice and they fought with each other. How was he to know that the Iraqi army had been disbanded? That was someone else’s fault.
Bush was just a victim of bad advisers and of his own noble trust in them. The failures were not caused by his arrogance, ignorance and grandiosity, the failures were the result of inferior subordinates who failed to carry out his perfect vision.
Yeah, that’s how we’ll play it and the chumps will lap it up..
---
Bruce Wilder said:
The fact of division and conflict is not particularly important. Every administration, every human organization, has that.
What is remarkable is that we are beginning to see how Bush’s personal incompetence as a leader and manager plays out into organizational palsy and policy disaster.
The letters seem proof enough (especially with Rat's deconstruction) that Bush was informed. In addition, the almost cavalier way that the information was conveyed, suggests that this was not the first time the subject was broached but rather referred to an ongoing discussion.
ReplyDelete"organizational palsy"
ReplyDelete---
"First you say you will,
and then you won't,
then you say you do,
and then you don't,
You're UNDECIDED now,
so whatareyou gonna do?"
"and Robert Reilly, a former director of the Voice of America radio station"
ReplyDelete---
Glad State got rid of him, too!
Perish the thought!
After talks with Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top American commander in Iraq, and Ryan C. Crocker, the ambassador to Iraq, Mr. Bush said that they “tell me that if the kind of success we are now seeing here continues it will be possible to maintain the same level of security with fewer American forces.”
ReplyDelete...
“Those decisions will be based on a calm assessment by our military commanders on the conditions on the ground — not a nervous reaction by Washington politicians to poll results in the media,” Mr. Bush told a gathering of American troops, who responded with a rousing cheer. “In other words, when we begin to draw down troops from Iraq, it will be from a position of strength and success, not from a position of fear and failure. To do otherwise would embolden our enemies and make it more likely that they would attack us at home.”
Could have made this announcement any time since February, when the Brits did. Claiming that success was assured.
If he had embraced Mr Maliki, instead of undermining him, then there'd be a picture of overall success, instead Team 43 has allowed Maliki to be scape goated, to the point that the WaPo relates how the US military sees the Iraqi Security Forces as hostile.
While others on General P's Staff disagree. No unity of purpose.
"Rather than conducting a counterinsurgency that supports a sectarian driven Iraqi government, the coalition should focus all elements of power on activities that facilitate a long-term peace or we risk becoming/remaining a part of the civil war," the briefing says.
Col. Steven Boylan, Petraeus's spokesman, disputed that conclusion. "They make assumptions about the government of Iraq that are not valid," Boylan said. "Saying the ruling coalition is party to the civil war, that is not what we see."
The authors argue that a shift in strategy on the ground could help forge a new consensus on Iraq in Washington: "The peacemaking process should be well underway by January 2008 or we may find that we have tactically created the space and time necessary but there has been insufficient progress towards reconciliation and reintegration -- resulting in a total collapse of political support in both the domestic public and the US Congress."
Which soldiers to believe, which briefing conclusions are correct?
Only the President can decide and then set the tone of progress.
Instead he allows the US to be buffetted by events rather than creating them.
The Team 43 should be so close to Maliki that they feel his package, not keeping a distance. Maliki and his government is still the key to strategic success, or US policies and losses over the last 4 years will have been for naught.
The US could have supported a Baathist Iraq, without Saddam, from the get go.
Mr Lewis's admonition taken as gospel around the world, to no good effect, for US, if we abandon Maliki now.
Trish's Adamant Assertion that
ReplyDelete"There WAS no other plan."
Is simply wrong.
- Doug
Garner was called by Feith in January specifically to bring together the myriad agency plans, which had been worked on since the formal request for them went out in late 01/early 02. Each agency and each department is responsible for developing plans for its own specific post-war responsibilites. In other words, the Justice Dept plans for the Justice Dept, Customs plans for Customs, DIA/CIA & etc plan for DIA/CIA & etc. Then it becomes the job of Garner, under DOD, to vet and coordinate these in early 2003.
At that time Garner becomes aware of Tom Warrick, who headed up the Future of Iraq Project over at State. Garner is impressed by Warrick and the little-known State group. Garner requests Warrick for his team and Rumsfeld tells him no. Rumsfeld tells Garner that the decision came from higher up and there's nothing he can do about it (there are two ways to read that) though other members of the Future Project would end up going with Garner to Iraq. The decision re Warrick is never explained to Garner. (Warrick vanishes and never gives an interview.) Garner does say that there was considerable resistance to some of the Project's recommendations and that this came from within the Pentagon and the Executive branch. This has been confirmed by others. There was no solid buy-in from the WH or DOD.
What the Future of Iraq Project advocated per necessity was a Germany/Japan type effort in Iraq, very unlike what was undertaken in Afghanistan. It accepted that broad democracy was the political goal and dealt with matters of transition in reaching that goal. The Democratic Principles working group, apparently, was subject to considerable political rivalry and dispute, much of it concerning certain favored exiles.
So Garner, though he is denied Warrick, plans on putting in motion much of the Future Project work on the ground in Iraq. Then the President's political appointee arrives and elements of the original State plan favored by Garner are changed. Garner believes these changes came out of the Inter-Agency Command Group, a DOD-led and coordinated task force.
So there was the Plan. Then the Plan changed. But it changed at the behest of Washington, not Baghdad. All the while the joint planning and coordination were the purview of Defense, under Presidential Directive.
If Mr Bush had written to Mr Bremer on 23 May 03 saying that he wanted the Iraqi Army recalled to the barracks and put under a joint US/Iraqi Command structure, Mr Bremer would have recalled the Iraqi Army and ...
ReplyDeleteBut Mr Bush did not.
Mr Bush instead wrote
"... You have my full support and confidence. You also have the backing of our Administration that knows our work will take time. ..."
Mr Bush was not operating under a requirement to discuss that decision with Mr Powell nor with the Joint Chiefs. Mr Bush was under no obligation to put them in the decision loop.
The fault for that, if there is even fault to be accessed, is not Mr Bremer's.
Mr Bremer was clear on 22 May as to the actions he was going to take regarding the Iraqi military. Mr Bush provided "...full support and confidence. You also have the backing of our Administration ..." for those actions.
Plain as the ink on the paper. If Mr Bush decided there had been planning enough, well, then there had been.
"Administration officials tell TIME that the U.S. would place advisers in Iraqi ministries to link Garner's office directly to everyday affairs."
ReplyDeleteIndeed.
What Garner and later Bremer encountered, however, was the immediate post-war collapse of 19 of Baghdad's 23 ministries.
As with the plan to put the Iraqi military on the payroll and employ it in reconstruction work, according to Garner, the reality encountered upon arrival was a military that had simply dissolved.
The best-laid plans of mice and men...
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteIf Mr Bush has forgotten of that committment to Mr Bremer, well that just goes to show how the stress of being the Decider can effect short term memory.
ReplyDeleteIt is an affliction that many Texicans suffer from, just look at how badly Mr Gonzo was strickem by memory loss. He couldn't recall much of nothin', from just a few months prior.
Let alone forty-eight months or so.
"If Mr Bush had written to Mr Bremer on 23 May 03 saying that he wanted the Iraqi Army recalled to the barracks and put under a joint US/Iraqi Command structure, Mr Bremer would have recalled the Iraqi Army and ...
ReplyDeleteBut Mr Bush did not."
And why didn't he? Who was GWB listening to?
A Jacksonian writes even longer "explanations" of why there was not more than one plan.
ReplyDeleteEven though there plainly were.
That resolving such differences satifactorily is perhaps GWB's greatest and most recurring failure mode, does not change that fact.
Course it IS always possible that L. Craig DID go around cleaning up bathroom tissues in public bathrooms.
To hear the right wing chorus tell it, it could be true.
You attempt to explain the mechanism for how policy was eventually carried out, and who was responsible for what.
ReplyDeleteI simply made the assertion that there was more than one plan.
To deny that is like denying that the sun rose this morning.
---
"The fact of division and conflict is not particularly important. Every administration, every human organization, has that.
What is remarkable is that we are beginning to see how Bush’s personal incompetence as a leader and manager plays out into organizational palsy and policy disaster.
"
Confirmed:
ReplyDeleteGore to vie for Michellin Man in '08!
"Mr Rumsfeld, in an attempt to outmaneuver the State Department, which is deeply suspicious of Mr Chalabi, sent memos to President George Bush urging that an interim government led by exile leaders be set up in coalition- controlled southern Iraq, irrespective of what happened in Baghdad. Mr Rumsfeld's move is likely to meet powerful objections from the State Department, which doubts Mr Chalabi has much support inside a country he left as a child of 11 in 1956. "
ReplyDeleteIn the end, what did we actually end up with?
The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was the provisional government of Iraq from July 13, 2003 to June 1, 2004. It was established by and served under the United States-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The IGC consisted of various Iraqi political, religious, and tribal leaders who were appointed by the CPA to provide advice and leadership of the country until the June 2004 transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government (which was replaced in May 2005 by the Iraqi Transitional Government, which was then replaced the following year by the first permanent government).
The Council's ethnic and religious breakdown included 13 Shi'ites, five Sunni Arabs, five Kurds (also Sunnis), one ethnic Turk and an Assyrian. Three of its members were women.
In September 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council gained regional recognition from the Arab League, which agreed to seat its representative in Iraq's chair at its meetings. On June 1, 2004, the Council dissolved after choosing member Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer as the president of the new Iraq interim government. Full sovereignty was transferred to the interim government (and the CPA dissolved) on June 28.
Who comprised the IGC?
* Samir Shakir Mahmoud
* Sondul Chapouk
* Ahmed Chalabi (p)
* Naseer al-Chaderchi
* Adnan Pachachi (p)
* Mohammed Bahr al-Uloum (p)
* Massoud Barzani (p)
* Jalal Talabani (p)- first and current President of Iraq
* Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim (p)
* Ahmed al-Barak
* Ibrahim al-Jaafari (p)- served as second interim Prime Minister of Iraq
* Raja Habib al-Khuzaai
* Aquila al-Hashimi (died following assassination attack on September 25, 2003); replaced by Salama al-Khufaji on December 8
* Younadem Kana
* Salaheddine Bahaaeddin
* Mahmoud Othman
* Hamid Majid Mousa
* Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer (p) - Final council president, served as interim President of Iraq
* Ezzedine Salim (p) (died in car bomb on May 17, 2004)
* Mohsen Abdel Hamid (p)
* Iyad Allawi (p) - served as first interim Prime Minister of Iraq
* Wael Abdul Latif
* Mowaffak al-Rubaie
* Dara Noor Alzin
* Abdel-Karim Mahoud al-Mohammedawi
"The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was the provisional government of Iraq from July 13, 2003 to June 1, 2004. It was established by and served under the United States-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The IGC consisted of various Iraqi political, religious, and tribal leaders who were appointed by the CPA to provide advice and leadership of the country until the June 2004 transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government (which was replaced in May 2005 by the Iraqi Transitional Government, which was then replaced the following year by the first permanent government)."
ReplyDelete---
There are numerous accounts, from many sources, citing Viceroy Bremmer's actions and inactions as being responsible providing the time necessary for the insurgency to organize and build.
Whether these accounts are on the whole true, or not does not change the fact that they exist.
Just as the evolution and compostion of the IGC does not change the fact that Jerry Bremmer was state's choice, and that outcome of who ultimately ran the show was determined by the outcome of the Wars within the Administration, which the decider took pains to explain was as it should be.
...as opposed to the view that perhaps having a cabinet that could work together just might possibly be a better idea.
There are always different plans and ideas.
Not all administrations are composed of folks with numerous mutually exclusive ideas overseen by a decider that many times did not.
From the WaPo, NOV 03:
ReplyDelete[...] "This was a mistake, to dissolve the army and the police," said Ayad Alawi, head of the security committee of the Iraqi Governing Council. "We absolutely not only lost time. The vacuum allowed our enemies to regroup and to infiltrate the country."
Retired Marine Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, a vocal opponent of the war, calls the move the Bush administration's "worst mistake" in postwar Iraq.
Supporters of the decision counter that the army posed a potential threat to a fledgling Iraqi governing authority and U.S. forces -- and that it was so second-rate and so infiltrated with Baath Party figures that it could not be salvaged.
"The Iraqi army was a pretty sick organization in a lot of respects," said Douglas J. Feith, undersecretary of defense for policy, who played a role in the demobilization decision. "There was quite a bit of cruelty -- abuse by the senior officers of the junior people -- and there was quite a bit of corruption."
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has said the army effectively disbanded itself in the face of the U.S.-led invasion. "They just disbanded and went home," he told NBC television recently. "There were conscripts, and they weren't paid very well, and they just left."
A former intelligence officer who recently returned from Iraq said more could have been done.
"How about announcing that we wanted them to reassemble? They could go out on the border. They could do static security. They could help against drive-by shootings," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "You've got one battalion after seven months of occupation. You could have several divisions by now."
The question of what to do with the Iraqi army arose before the war. In January, two months before the battle in Iraq began, Bush assigned planning for the war and its aftermath to the Pentagon. Rumsfeld recruited Jay M. Garner, a retired Army lieutenant general, to pull together competing administration plans and to govern Baghdad after the presumed overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
Garner and his top aides, including retired Gens. Jared Bates and Ron Adams, proposed paying 300,000 to 400,000 members of the Iraqi regular army at war's end. Also, Iraqi soldiers who surrendered to advancing U.S. forces would be formed into work units. Private contractors were recruited to help make that happen.
Military planners inside the government assumed, based on prewar intelligence, that some Iraqi units would switch sides during the war, while others would remain in their garrisons awaiting instructions from the U.S. postwar leadership. U.S. aircraft had been dropping leaflets for weeks calling on Iraqi forces to prepare for a brighter future by laying down their arms.
Looking ahead, members of the State Department's Future of Iraq working group on defense had developed a similar plan, concluding that former soldiers could provide valuable intelligence while performing reconnaissance and security missions.
Ahmed Hashim, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, offered a practical solution to Bush administration war planners. Arguing that the question did not demand an all-or-nothing approach, he favored purging the army of its most disreputable leaders and distilling the remaining forces into usable units. He also said soldiers should be paid, to minimize the chances that they would fight the occupation forces.
Garner consulted with Rumsfeld several times on the issue and briefed national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, a knowledgeable official said. He won approval for his plans at a Feb. 28 White House meeting with Bush and principal national security aides.
On March 11, the Pentagon announced its intention to pay several hundred thousand members of the regular Iraqi army. The elite and politicized Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard, loyal to Hussein, would not be included.
The designs were in place as Garner arrived in Baghdad on April 21, a dozen days after Hussein's government fell, but even supporters concede pieces were missing. Details did not extend much beyond paying soldiers to keep out of trouble, several officials said. Paying them was "step one of something that was probably not very well fleshed out," said Bates, Garner's chief of staff.
"The first idea was paying them just to get them to stand by, with more to follow. Just to keep everything calm in the first days and weeks of the occupation. It was not 'Okay, we're going to organize 10 or 15 battalions,' " Bates recalled. "The decision on standing up the new Iraqi army had not been made."
As Garner was developing the policy amid the unexpected lawlessness in Baghdad, the White House replaced him with Bremer, a terrorism specialist with high-level State Department experience. He arrived May 12 with a mandate from Bush to take firm control of the U.S. occupation.
By that time, the prewar intelligence had proved inaccurate. No Iraqi units changed sides, and the number of surrendering forces was small. Iraqis had sacked Army garrisons, and entire divisions had melted away.
Bremer soon declared in internal meetings that no Iraqi units would be reconstituted and that soldiers would not be paid. On May 23, he issued a formal order that dismissed the army and canceled pensions. The order covered many categories of Iraqis, among them war widows and disabled veterans who were senior party members, defined as any officers at the rank of colonel or above.
U.S. officials in Baghdad, including Garner and Bates, were startled.
"It came with formidable force and decisiveness, as the president's policy. Nobody was supposed to challenge it and that was that," said one U.S. official in Baghdad at the time. Another said: "There was never a discussion that I was involved in where we would disband the military. It caught me completely by surprise."
The second official, recalling violent crime in the Iraqi capital, said Iraqi commanders had offered to gather soldiers, who would be paid for their work. The Americans could easily have pulled together "a couple of thousand military police in the Baghdad region," he said. "Many of the soldiers had taken their weapons home. Some had armored vehicles."
The demobilization decision appears to have originated largely with Walter B. Slocombe, a former undersecretary of defense appointed to oversee Iraqi security forces. He believed strongly in the need to disband the army and felt that vanquished soldiers should not expect to be paid a continuing salary. He said he developed the policy in discussions with Bremer, Feith and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz.
"This is not something that was dreamed up by somebody at the last minute and done at the insistence of the people in Baghdad. It was discussed," Slocombe said. "The critical point was that nobody argued that we shouldn't do this."
Slocombe recalled discussing the issue with Wolfowitz on May 8 and with Feith several times, including on May 22, the night before Bremer issued the formal order. Trying to put the army back together at that point, he said, "would've been a practical disaster."
Beyond the practical difficulties of outfitting destroyed military bases, Slocombe said, an announcement that Hussein's Sunni Muslim-dominated army would retain considerable power would have produced "huge problems immediately" among the country's Shiite majority. Some at the Pentagon feared that the army could become an organized opposition to the U.S. military.
Senior U.S. military officers in the Persian Gulf region said they had advised Slocombe that the dissolution of the army -- recognized as an institution more loyal to Iraq than to Hussein -- would harm U.S. strategy. Demobilization was "a very basic mistake," said W. Patrick Lang, a retired chief analyst for Middle Eastern affairs for the Defense Intelligence Agency.
"In fact, most of the Iraqi army officers were nationalists, and they don't want to see the country break up," Lang said. He said carefully screened Iraqi units under U.S. control "would do much better against this enemy than we can."
Beyond the operational questions, opponents were disturbed that Garner's plans to pay soldiers to win their support had been abandoned. One former U.S. official in Baghdad put it this way: "Magnanimity in victory is an American trait. I'm surprised we blew it off this time."
An estimated 2,000 Iraqi soldiers protested the policy outside the U.S. compound in Baghdad on June 18, some of them hurling rocks, others carrying signs that said "Please Keep Your Promises." U.S. military police fired on the crowd, killing two.
On June 25, five weeks after Bremer's order, U.S. authorities reversed course again. Bremer ordered payments to about 370,000 conscripts and more than 250,000 officers, said a Pentagon official, who put the bill at $250 million for one year. The U.S. administration hopes to phase out the payments by mid-2004.
Hurrying to put together security forces -- including army, police and civil defense units -- the U.S. occupation has been recruiting former Iraqi soldiers. Slocombe said 60 percent of the enlisted soldiers in the new Iraqi army served in the old Iraqi army and all but two officers have prior service.
[...]
Texas startup says it has batteries beat
ReplyDelete"There are numerous accounts, from many sources, citing Viceroy Bremmer's actions and inactions as being responsible providing the time necessary for the insurgency to organize and build."
ReplyDeleteReally. Where was CENTCOM during the looting? Where was Garner? Where was Rumsfeld? What was the response of the latter to the brazen lawlessness and violence in Iraq in those early days?
A former intelligence officer who recently returned from Iraq said more could have been done.
ReplyDelete""How about announcing that we wanted them to reassemble? "
---
""This is not something that was dreamed up by somebody at the last minute and done at the insistence of the people in Baghdad. It was discussed," Slocombe said. "The critical point was that ***nobody argued that we shouldn't do this.***""
...and *I* have a Bridge in Brooklyn that just happens to be for sale.
---
"Beyond the operational questions, opponents were disturbed that Garner's plans to pay soldiers to win their support had been abandoned. One former U.S. official in Baghdad put it this way: "Magnanimity in victory is an American trait. I'm surprised we blew it off this time."
An estimated 2,000 Iraqi soldiers protested the policy outside the U.S. compound in Baghdad on June 18, some of them hurling rocks, others carrying signs that said "Please Keep Your Promises." U.S. military police fired on the crowd, killing two.
On June 25, five weeks after Bremer's order, U.S. authorities reversed course again. Bremer ordered payments to about 370,000 conscripts and more than 250,000 officers, said a Pentagon official, who put the bill at $250 million for one year.
---
Thank you,
You've made my point:
A Jacksonian argues there were NO POSSIBLE other actions that could have been taken, given the circumstances.
As you seem to imply here:
"As with the plan to put the Iraqi military on the payroll and employ it in reconstruction work, according to Garner, the reality encountered upon arrival was a military that had simply dissolved.
The best-laid plans of mice and men... "
---
But the fact that they were not paid before and then they were plainly proves that was not the case:
The situation on the ground did not mandate one and only one possible course of action.
There were many options, with policy ultimately arrived at through:
"organizational palsy and policy disaster."
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteToday, more than four years after the decision to disband the Iraqi was made, due to fears it would be the center of opposition to the US, staff members of the US Army's Commander in Iraq, General P, believe the democratic government and the Iraqi Security Forces, all US vetted and trained, should be consider a hostile force.
ReplyDeleteThis is not the Command's view at this time, though it must be a reasonably viable one, to even have been seriously put on the table.
The obvious conclusion being that those who felt that Saddam's forces, if flipped for merely a monthly stipend, would have become hostile to the US almost immediately have been vindicated by subsequent events.
I do not assert DOD and Garner were perfect, Trish.
ReplyDelete(we both know only the CIA comes close)
That does not negate the effects of Bremmer's later decisions, over the course of a year.
...but it is apparent that conceding the obvious is not one of your strong points!
Tue Sep 04, 05:51:00 PM EDT
ReplyDeleteBlack and White.
Yes or no.
As opposed to reality, which is always messy.
Some would have, some would not.
ReplyDeleteElsewise, no one should ever bother "following the money."
One thing for sure:
ReplyDeleteDoing one thing and then doing another, repeatedly, over the course of time, is not the best way to run a post-war. (palsy)
"Stay the Course"
Notwithstanding.
From almost the very beginning, doug, many of the Iraqi we subsidized and trained were not loyal to US interests.
ReplyDeleteOr those 100,000 US supplied weapons would not be missing and the MNF would not be subject to ambush by members of the Federal Iraqi Police and members of the Iraqi Army, as described by the 82nd Airborne Seven.
Mr Totten describes a similar infiltration, of the Iraqi Army, which is both a funny and inaccurate discription of what is happening, but one that no one chooses to laugh at.
As if being loyal to US interests would be considered synonymous to being loyal to Iraq's.
Well, I'd wager Mr Sistani gets a chuckle, every now and then.
It could be true that no course of action would have resulted in a better outcome.
ReplyDeleteThat is different than to assert that no other courses of action were possible, or that there were not various plans by various actors to do just that.
---
"May 23, he issued a formal order that dismissed the army and canceled pensions.
The order covered many categories of Iraqis, among them war widows and disabled veterans who were senior party members, defined as any officers at the rank of colonel or above."
---
A brilliant PR move, gauranteed to win hearts and minds!
...good that we were so careful with our money.
"As with the plan to put the Iraqi military on the payroll and employ it in reconstruction work, according to Garner, the reality encountered upon arrival was a military that had simply dissolved."
ReplyDeleteThis is Garner's own observation of the practical difficulties of implementing his plan upon arrival in Iraq. The conditions expected in the case of the Iraqi military were not those subsequently encountered.
Rather than rehash the turmolt of 2003 the idea that Mr maliki and the Shia dominated Iraqi Government is hostile to US, and what to do about that ...
ReplyDeleteGeneral P's COIN Manual description of 500,000 troops, of which no Iraqi could not be considered a viable part, and ten to twenty years, that'd be a place to start the discussion of the "New Way Forward"
When was the "deck of cards" published?
ReplyDeleteThen, what to do with that UN recongnized governmet, in Iraq?
ReplyDeleteConsidered sovereign by most of the world community. Thanks to US diplomatic initiatives, early on.
Drive that Government into the arms of the Russians?
Or the Chinese?
I'd bet the Russians would sign their friendship book.
Mr Putin would not be such a stickler for police protocols or prison over crowding.
Basra with a Russian Trade attache busy writing contracts, those Russians could fill those billets, I'd bet.
The contracts were let sometime prior to Bush taking office!
ReplyDelete:-)
Developed by a team from the army's 4th Psychological Operations Group, [1] the deck of cards was first announced publicly in Iraq on April 11th 2003, ...
ReplyDelete30 to 60 days lead time, for graphics, printing and shipping. The cards were printed in the US.
From Wiki:
ReplyDelete1/ The war began on March 20, 2003.
2/ The deck of cards (personality identification playing cards) was first announced publicly in Iraq on April 11th 2003.
What we need to know is what happened in between those dates.
"This is Garner's own observation of the practical difficulties of implementing his plan upon arrival in Iraq. "
ReplyDeleteI did not argue otherwise, which is not the same as saying all elements of the plan were no longer feasible - as many of the quotes of yours above point out.
Some of the members of Card fraternity bugged out?
ReplyDeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteThey were gathering the photos, names and related info by the 4th Psychological Operations Group.
ReplyDeletePhotoshopping the pictures, getting approvals ...
All the Standard Army stuff ...
Under thirty days.
Damned quick for a Federal project.
Expedited I'd say.
My understanding is that Saddam’s Generals wanted to deal, but were dealt out from the table with a pack of cards. :)
ReplyDeleteNot as quick as the "Saudi 19" were identified and vetted, however!
ReplyDeleteIt's all a pack of lies Mat!
ReplyDeleteBelieve it!
First thing that happened, mat. Drive to Baghdad
ReplyDeleteThe US Army took Baghdad on 7Apr03
By the 11Apr03 they had the cards
Didn't need those Generals any more. Their forces were scattered and ineffective.
ReplyDeleteThose still willing to fight for Iraq, gone to ground in the Sunni triangle.
"Mr Putin would not be such a stickler for police protocols or prison over crowding."
ReplyDelete---
Thank Gawd we're all caring and compassionate, whatever the consequences.
DeBaathification, that had been decided upon and not much debate has ensued over that. The Government, representing the people ofiraq, did not want those NAZI clones around.
ReplyDeleteStill digging up the mass graves left behind by those Baathist Generals, aren't they?
“They were gathering the photos, names and related info by the 4th Psychological Operations Group..”
ReplyDeleteIf this was the plan, why wasn’t this done prior to the invasion? All this information was already available. No. There was a change of plan, AFTER the invasion. About 2 weeks after, I would say.
The real issue, back then, was the low priority given to building a new Iraqi Security Force.
ReplyDeleteInitially thought to be 30 or 40,000 strong, as I recall.
Not nearly enough.
Then the trainers were second rate, as the Special Forces experts were drawn off to perform "smash and grab" SWAT style raids.
Thought it was an issue at the time, but others discounted the importance of training the Iraqi. Thus their poor performance, early on.
A cascading series of failures, each augmenting the next.
Most likely not, mat.
ReplyDeleteThe decision to invade, on a strategic level coming in Jan 03, per reports.
That word not getting to the Sp4s doing the assembly work until much later. Then the Federals are SLOW, the Army, even SLOWER, in noncombative units. Most likely not until the first Phase line was crossed, on 20Mar
The 4th Psychological Operations Group would not, most likely, have those 52 photos and bios in their files. Cross agency cooperation, even within DoD Intelligence Units, time consuming.
Then the printing and shipping, a week, even if expedited. Guarantteed. I've done a lot of color printing on card stock, lots of graphics, it takes a while and I'll wager that the 4th Psychological Operations Group does not have better, more efficent artists and printers than I have access to.
"I do not assert DOD and Garner were perfect, Trish."
ReplyDeleteNo, you have simply picked up on every anti-State, anti-Agency meme out there. That much hasn't changed from the Belmont days. It has been a cottage industry for Wretchard and others.
S'allright. The Left does the same with DOD so it all comes out in the wash.
Trish is simply determined to defend the red-headed step-child of either side, being enamored of neither side.
How could there be a change of plans when the WERE no other plans, Mat???
ReplyDelete---
That Babbin would assert otherwise does nothing but prove that he is a liar!
Ah, yes, Trish,
ReplyDeletewe remember:
You worship REASON,
good librarian that you are.
---
The riff raff merely following our passions!
dRat,
ReplyDeleteThe cards were first announced publicly in Iraq on April 11th 2003. When exactly these cards were conceived, printed, and finally distributed is yet unclear.
Iraqi unit commanders were given incentive to kindly step out of the way of advancing US forces.
ReplyDeleteBombs were dropped.
ReplyDelete"That Babbin would assert otherwise..."
ReplyDeleteWhat Babbin asserted is that the Admin/DOD plan was to roll on to Syria and Iran from Baghdad. What Babbin asserted is that the neocons, along with their helpers at State and CIA, put the kibosh on that plan by deliberately high-grounding us in Iraq.
Not that kind of encouragement.
ReplyDelete"The riff raff merely following our passions!"
ReplyDeleteBingo.
Sucks to be Human!
ReplyDeleteWhat Babbin asserted is that the Admin/DOD plan was to roll on to Syria and Iran from Baghdad. What Babbin asserted is that the (..) State and CIA, put the kibosh on that plan by deliberately high-grounding us in Iraq.
ReplyDeleteWhich is what we're asserting, Trish.
Got evidence?
ReplyDeleteTo get to the bottom of all that is happening in Iraq, all you have to do is listen to Katie Couric Reporting From Iraq. She's on the ground, interviewing the generals, soldiers, and locals, too, so don't miss Katie, and keep informed.
ReplyDeleteTrish,
ReplyDeleteI haven’t heard of Babbin until today, when Doug mentioned the name. But his general argument as it applies to the CIA and State Department, as you know, I have made more than once.
There was no substantive argument, mat, on Babbin's part. There was only assertion.
ReplyDeleteYou yourself have never presented a substantive argument against either.
A feeling is not an argument. An emotion is not evidence.
And an assertion is not a case.
ReplyDeleteThanks for that, AlBobAl!
ReplyDeleteAka Baghdad AlBob
Trish,
ReplyDeleteI wasn’t there, so there’s no ”evidence” I can bring to bear.
But, given your general views (if they are representative) and of many others in the CIA and State Department, who against all protocol tried to publicly embarrass the President and did everything possible to scuttle the decision to go to war, I would give Mr Babbin (who was there) more than the benefit of the doubt.
Funny how contemporary arguments at the time matched those here now, with the Staters and Agency Artistes arguing the folley of punishing Syria, and the DOD types stressing the foley of unmolested sanctuaries.
ReplyDeleteShe asked for evidence of the CIA trying to embarass the Admin, mat, to one of my assertions, 2 days later their was a compilation of impressive magnitude.
ReplyDeleteHow someone can defend Armitage and Powell letting the country hang, and assert that Armie was being a good soldier is beyond me!
Chemical Ali To Join Cousin Saddam
ReplyDelete"But, given your general views (if they are representative) and of many others in the CIA and State Department..."
ReplyDeleteMat. Trish's mortgage is paid by DOD.
Mat's is sorta paid by the Canadian Healthcare system.
ReplyDeleteMore or less.
Maybe so, Trish. But your passion is with the CIA and DOS. :)
ReplyDeletePerish the thought of such Passions!
ReplyDeleteLOL! Doug,
ReplyDeleteInsurance Co. ;)
My Cardiologist shocked me when he said the reforms put into place in California re: Medical legal settlements, are still working today!
ReplyDeleteSome kind of record.
His point being that in Hawaii, few new Doctors can afford to practice here, and such reforms are badly needed.
**Put in place THIRTY ONE YEARS AGO!**
ReplyDeleteHow many "reforms" actually work, much less over a period of time!
ReplyDelete"the DOD types stressing the foley of unmolested sanctuaries."
ReplyDeleteWould that include Rumsfeld?
O Lord sometimes I wonder why I get up in the morning--Lars Larsen is reporting that Larry Craig is reconsidering his decision to step down from the Senate Sept. 30.
ReplyDeleteAren't there enough circuses and county fairs this time of year?
Would that include Cheney, former Secretary?
ReplyDeleteWould that include Meyers, or Pace? Or Casey?
Hah! Lars and I got it to you first. It is just now on Drudge. al-bob-al boise-iti reporting
ReplyDeleteWHO are the DOD types stressing the folly of unmolested sanctuary?
ReplyDelete"The top military general in Iraq hinted to ABC's Martha Raddatz that next week's much-anticipated report on the status of the troop surge in Iraq would include a recommendation for troop reduction in March, if not sooner, to avoid a strain on the Army."
ReplyDeleteSo no 18-month rotations.
And we will never go below 120K under Bush.
el al bob,
ReplyDeleteTrish has summoned you to duty!
Trish,
ReplyDeleteRumsfeld was stuck. They were all stuck. Once the decision was made to go with the Iranians, that was it.
Yeah,
ReplyDeleteAnswer those questions Baghdad AlBob!
Hey, AlBob:
ReplyDeleteI predicted that several threads ago, altho it was with GWB pushing it, the better to win in '08.
Say the curse!
Hah!--What did old bob tell you!
ReplyDeleteBilly Martin, one of Craig's lawyers, said the Senator's arrest in an undercover police operation at a Minneapolis airport men's room "raises very serious constitutional questions."
Craig
Billy represented Michael Vick, and is looking for a good fee.
DAMN!!
Pubs should show up with Toilet Seats around their necks.
ReplyDeletemen's room.. constitutional questions..
ReplyDeleteI wonder what he meant..
:D
On Middle Eastern questions, I can do no better than refer everyone to Katie Couric. She's on the ground, not staying in the Green
ReplyDeleteZone, and has her eyes and ears open, and her mental gears turning.
GREAT idea, Doug. And all toe tapping in unison. With secret hand signals.
I was refering to the dispassionate partisans of the DOD on these forums, vs the Vituperative defenders of State and the Agency, Trish.
ReplyDeletePalms up and Bombs Away, AlBob!
ReplyDeleteIt's just a regular constitutional question, Mat.
ReplyDeleteWe all need our Constitutionals.
ReplyDeleteTo maintain regularity.
ReplyDeleteHow many World Series has Martin Won?
ReplyDeleteThis is Serious!
World Serious!
from the Lewiston Morning Fishwrap--
ReplyDeleteSOME UI FUNDING MAY BE IN JEOPARDY
It's often derided as 'pork'....
One such researcher is Greg Gollberg, a UofI forestry professor(by the way we have one of the best forestry departments in the country here) and project director for the Fire Research and Management Exchange System, or FRAMES.....has received more than half its funding due to Craig's once power influence in Congress.
"I don't know of another vehicle that is suited to fund what we're doing better than an earmark," said Gollberg.
The democratic university community is starting to whine as they realize the government teat might quit flowing here, with Craig gone. Earmarks will make a republican out of many a democrat, depending on the circumstances.
Mother's Milk.
ReplyDeleteI'm praying InNoWay is immortal, since he'll be replaced by a Dem Anyhow.
ReplyDeleteUpgrade that Supercomputer!
ReplyDeleteSpeed up the fast-tracking Telescope.
Fast Track Everything!
Just a few of my dispassionate desires.
ReplyDelete"I would give Mr Babbin (who was there) more than the benefit of the doubt."
ReplyDeleteWhere was he?
Don't say I never gave you nuthin, Trish:
ReplyDeleteWith The Paul People
I spent a lot of time talking with Ron Paul people at the Texas Straw Poll --there were hundreds of Paul volunteers, mostly at the Fort Worth Convention Center, but scattered throughout downtown and in front of all the major hotels.
Here's Part I<
Part II
Part III
Part IVMy
interview with Congressman Paul is here.
At Human Events, Silly!
ReplyDelete'Rat will explain that "Human" is all-encompassing.
ReplyDeleteAn Army of Humans.
ReplyDeleteOr, rather, One Human.
ReplyDeleteShowing my age, again.
I am he as you are he as you are me
ReplyDeleteand we are all together
See how they run like pigs from a gun
see how they fly
I'm crying
Sitting on a cornflake
Waiting for the van to come
Corporation T-shirt, stupid bloody Tuesday
Man you've been a naughty boy
you let your face grow long
I am the eggman
they are the eggmen
I am the walrus
Goo goo g' joob
HT - DR
"At Human Events, Silly!"
ReplyDeleteAt The American Prospect, rather.
Thanks for the links on all those quotes, Trish!
ReplyDelete"My Cardiologist shocked me when he said..."
ReplyDelete---
'Course he already had the paddles on me, since I flatlined on him.
Fire the Neocons, Fight the War
ReplyDeleteJed Babbin
Just a hunch, but I think he may be refering to Syria, among others:
ReplyDelete---
"We who lived through the Vietnam era understand that the lesson of Vietnam isn’t that we have to win the “hearts and minds” of the peoples of the Middle East.
We know it isn’t that we cannot pull out of Iraq prematurely. We know that we can be in Iraq for another sixty days or another sixty years and the situation will not improve much while Iraq’s neighbors continue to man, fund and arm the insurgency.
The lesson of Vietnam is much different from the one the President apprehends.
The lesson is this: if you fail to fight a war in a manner calculated to win it decisively, you will lose it inevitably. "
AlBobAl's Man in Washington.
ReplyDeleteWas it in another article, Trish, or were you just being hyperbolic with this?
ReplyDelete('s OK: we all get that way, sometimes)
"What Babbin asserted is that the Admin/DOD plan was to roll on to Syria and Iran from Baghdad. What Babbin asserted is that the (..) State and CIA, put the kibosh on that plan by deliberately high-grounding us in Iraq."
Babbin lived through the Vietnam era?
ReplyDeleteThat's good to know.
In January 2003, President Bush was presented with two post-invasion plans for Iraq. One, authored by the Defense Department, called for a hard and fast invasion, establishment of a provisional government in Baghdad, and an exit from Iraq in very few months, to enable our forces to deal with the neighboring state sponsors of terrorism, Iran and Syria. The other, authored by the State Department and the CIA, was for the extended occupation and nation-building in Iraq.
ReplyDeleteIn between was 9-11, and George Bush’s conversion to the neocon “strategy” to fight the war we’re in.
- Babbin
What about the deliberately high-grounding Kibosh thing?
ReplyDeleteHold on, Doug!
ReplyDeleteTrish,
That last statement which you attributed to Babbin, would you characterize it as fair and accurate?
Oh, I'm sure that's in there.
ReplyDeleteJust as the fact that Babbin "was there" is in there.
Which one, mat?
ReplyDeleteThe one you've posted just above @10:45
ReplyDeleteNo, I wouldn't.
ReplyDeleteOk. What’s inaccurate about it?
ReplyDeleteMF's a GD'd LIAR!
ReplyDeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteIn January 2003, President Bush was presented with two post-invasion plans for Iraq. One, authored by the Defense Department, called for a hard and fast invasion"
ReplyDeleteWho was arguing for a soft and slow one? State? Wasn't their war.
"establishment of a provisional government in Baghdad"
which we got
"and an exit from Iraq in very few months"
a drawdown, that is. But not a withdrawal. And that was before we met the insurgency's acquaintance.
"to enable our forces to deal with the neighboring state sponsors of terrorism, Iran and Syria."
Funny no one heard about that.
'Rat's Blood Debt, and all that:
ReplyDeleteRudy had attended 800 memorials before Hillary had attended 1.
Trish:
ReplyDelete"Who was arguing for a soft and slow one? State? Wasn't their war."
What do you mean? The State and CIA did not present any plans for the war?
"establishment of a provisional government in Baghdad"
The provisional government that was planed or the provisional government was improvised?
"a drawdown, that is. But not a withdrawal. And that was before we met the insurgency's acquaintance. "
Some argue that the insurgency is directly linked to the choice in the provisional government and its actions.
"Funny no one heard about that."
Funny how everyone expected it. That Iran and Syria would shortly follow.
(Trish, I took down my last post, it was a bit much, even for me)
David Beats Goliath
ReplyDelete(actually the bible says some other dude beat Goliath)---"The biggest upset in college football history"
Correction:
ReplyDelete..or the provisional government ^that was improvised?
"What do you mean? The State and CIA did not present any plans for the war?"
ReplyDeleteThey presented plans for THEIR end. In their lanes, so to speak. That's how it works.
"The provisional government that was planed or the provisional government was improvised?"
Both. And improvisation was always going to be a part of it.
"Some argue that the insurgency is directly linked to the choice in the provisional government and its actions."
Do they?
And I can't account for other people's expectations.
"They presented plans for THEIR end. In their lanes, so to speak. That's how it works."
ReplyDeleteWhat was their lane? What was the plan and how is it different from what transpired? How was it different from Mr Babbin characterization?
Christ, mat.
ReplyDeleteIt's late and I have to get up early.
Tomorrow.
Yes. I'm barely managing to keep my eyes open. g'nite.
ReplyDeleteThat's what they all say, Mat. I've had em' say it to me, too:)
ReplyDeleteBob,
ReplyDeleteTouché. :)
We'll massage her a little more tomorrow. :)
And now, really, g'nite all!
Thanks for the ht, 2164th.
ReplyDeleteWe appreciate your participation Sam.
ReplyDeleteNot funny, AlBob:
ReplyDeleteSomeone had a headache.
This isn't the romper room, ya know.
""Some argue that the insurgency is directly linked to the choice in the provisional government and its actions.""
ReplyDelete"Do they?"
---
Yeah, Mat:
None of the illiterate Ophra-watchers I know ever heard complaints of Viceroy Bremmer Dilly Dallying as the insurgency grew.
For God's Sakes, DON'T, Whatever you do, let Doug see THIS!
ReplyDeleteLike a good number of the many links above, but Trish identifies them all as misinformed, or liars, in order to defend the red-headed step-child of either side, being enamored of neither side.
ReplyDeleteI GOTTA Look, Rufus, Sorry!
ReplyDeleteKing Mswati III--what a lucky dog, Christ!
ReplyDeleteBeside, I know he wouldn't be interested in this:
ReplyDeleteTens of thousands of chanting, bare-breasted maidens have paraded before the King of Swaziland, many of them hoping to catch his eye and be picked out to become his 14th wife.
Must remain dispassionate, must defend the red-headed step-child, must not think of dark-eyed beauties.
ReplyDeleteooohmmm.
Friggin Union Asshole!
ReplyDelete""Here we have a problem:
the King has all powers vested in him," said Jan Sithole, secretary-general of the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions. "
I think this Gal's Right. I think We ARE "Lucky!"
ReplyDeleteUS CONSTITUTION TO CLEAR COCKROACH
ReplyDeleteHah! old bob knows a thing or two.
That bust had unconstitutional written all over it.
You can't fuck with a congressman coming or going from congress, but he can fuck with you
Should send L. Craig to deal with him.
ReplyDeleteI bet the Union Asshole wouldn't have seen a problem if "HE" WAS KING!
ReplyDeleteThat's right:
ReplyDeleteWhen Patrick Kennedy nearly wiped out 100's (driving while on "Ambien")
he pulled the old driving to work trick.
Still went to rehab.
L. Craig should get the treatment at the EB.
Doesn't look like a Prevert to me.
ReplyDeleteMuch.
Who is this 'Jan Shithole' person anyways?
ReplyDeleteCool as his cucumber, under stress.
ReplyDeleteThey shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place."
ReplyDeleteFrustrated Union guy.
ReplyDelete...like they all are.