Perhaps it is time to form an American fighting force that is decidedly foreign in appearance, culture, and language. Maybe the United States should raise several of them, and soon.
Many people have written about the United States’ reliance on contractors, and have suggested the use of foreign nationals to bolster the military’s ranks due to trouble at the recruiting stations. Normally, the prospect of armed foreigners or mercenaries executing foreign policy draws the ire of pundits, in and out of uniform. The normal counter-argument to any such suggestion is that “a military operation not worth employing American soldiers for are simply not worth doing”.
But what if there are military formations that could be more effective than those organized and employed in the orthodox manners of today? Would a new type of unit be worth creating, training, equipping, and deploying abroad then?
Many of the so-called flashpoints around the globe are in areas where languages and cultures are vastly different than our own. Take the subtleties of the different tribal, ethnic, and religious groups in many Middle Eastern countries, for instance. United States forces often have difficulty developing intelligence in such areas. Also, the heightened differences between the indigenous people and the American Soldiers’ cultures contribute to the force protection/enclave mentality that has arguably impeded the U.S.’s effectiveness; huge bases lead to massive manpower and logistics requirements, which increase the signature of American forces, which lead to more and more barriers between the population and the U.S. forces. Base operations in these cases often become ends in themselves.
But what if, instead of erecting ring after ring of Hesco barriers, the United States employed small units of soldiers who looked like the indigenous people, spoke their language, and shared their culture? Perhaps some of the enormous bases could downsize a bit, and the American presence would not seem so looming. More importantly, an ethnically aligned force such as this could likely swim through the proverbial sea of people there, gather intelligence more effectively, create a smaller footprint, and potentially achieve dramatic effects in the operational environment.
Small units of battalion size (400 Soldiers or less), comprised entirely of personnel of a similar ethnic background (for instance, an ethnic Pashtu Afghani battalion, or an Iraqi battalion), could be established and employed in areas where the United States has long term security commitments; if new, potentially enduring commitments arise in different regions, then additional units could be raised, trained, and employed.
An irregular force such as this could be highly effective at interfacing with the population in a counterinsurgency, gaining trust, and gathering intelligence to identify an insurgent network or cells; such a force would likely be effective working “by, with, and through” the indigenous force security elements to target and destroy the insurgent organization as well.
So you are saying the United States should establish a Foreign Legion, or hire foreign mercenaries then, correct? Well, no, not really. Before anyone considered recruiting foreigners to raise an ethnically homogeneous force or hiring guns (and opening up a massive political argument), the military could look at establishing such units comprised of people from various immigrant communities located right here in America. There are hundreds of thousands of Middle Easterners residing in and around Dearborn Michigan, for instance, many of them from places like Iraq; similarly, there are significant populations of Afghanis living in California, and communities from various Latin American countries living in Miami and New York.
The Department of Defense could very well establish targeted recruiting to raise an “Army of Foreigners” within its own borders. The aforementioned examples of Iraq and Afghanistan, where the United States has dedicated, long term security commitments, would be ideal starting points for such a force.
There are many practical issues to be resolved before any such force could be recruited equipped, trained, and fielded. Issues such as doctrine, organization, incentives, funding, among other things, would have to be resolved. However, this is the optimal time to develop innovative solutions for problems the United States is likely to face in the coming years.
Many diverse immigrant communities exist across America and they are often intensely proud of their cultures, languages, and traditions; if the Department of Defense learns how to harness them, it could potentially develop new tools for the many foreign policy challenges this country will face in the 21st century.
Post Script: Google the Lodge Act to see a Cold War attempt to do something of the nature described above (although considerably more ambitious than what this author is proposing).
